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SECURING ENTERPRISE SYSTEMS DATA ON SMART DEVICES
Mohamed EL-SERNGAWY
ABSTRACT
In near future smart devices such as phones and tablets will be the main computing device in
the business world. The mobility behavior of the smart device helps the business workers to
easily access their client’s information and make the right decision at the required time. How-
ever, people use smart devices for personal and business usage, which affect their companies
and organization’s enterprise systems. For instant, the information that smart device is able to
produce could be valuable business data at certain time and could be valuable private data at
another times such as camera photos. This overlap between the personal and business usage in
smart devices leads the companies to pay attention to their enterprise systems data security and
apply restrictions on the smart devices usage. However, the smart device users are not com-
fortable with losing control of their private data or having restrictions on their smart device. In
this work, we will study the usage and security of the smart device with the enterprise system.
We will classify the Enterprise mobile applications usage. We will study the possible threats
to expose the smart device user’s data and applying a new screenshot attack as an example
of these threats. Finally we will study the mobile virtualization technology and investigate its
security.
Keywords: Smartphone, Android, security architecture, threat vectors, risk analysis

SECURING ENTERPRISE SYSTEMS DATA ON SMART DEVICES
Mohamed EL-SERNGAWY
ABSTRACT
Dans un avenir proche dispositifs intelligents tels que les téléphones et les tablettes sera le dis-
positif principal de l’informatique dans le monde des affaires. Le comportement de la mobilité
de l’appareil intelligent aide les travailleurs d’entreprises d’accéder facilement à l’information
de leurs clients et de prendre la bonne décision au moment voulu. Cependant, les gens utilisent
des appareils intelligents pour l’utilisation personnelle et d’affaires, qui affectent leurs en-
treprises et organisations des systèmes de l’entreprise. Pour instant, les informations que
dispositif intelligent est capable de produire pourrait être précieuses données commerciales
à certain moment et pourrait être utile données privées à un autre temps, comme des photos de
l’appareil photo. Ce chevauchement entre l’utilisation personnelle et professionnelle dans des
dispositifs intelligents conduit les entreprises à faire attention à leur sécurité des données des
systèmes d’entreprise et d’appliquer des restrictions à l’utilisation intelligente des dispositifs.
Toutefois, les utilisateurs d’appareils intelligents ne sont pas à l’aise avec de perdre le contrôle
de leurs données privées ou ayant des restrictions sur leur appareil intelligent. Dans ce tra-
vail, nous allons étudier l’utilisation et la sécurité du dispositif intelligent avec le système de
l’entreprise. Nous allons classer les applications mobiles Enterprise utilisation. Nous allons
étudier les menaces possibles pour exposer les données de l’utilisateur de l’appareil intelligent
et l’application d’une nouvelle attaque comme un exemple de ces menaces de capture d’écran.
Enfin, nous allons étudier la technologie de virtualisation mobile et enquêter sur sa sécurité.
Keywords: Smartphone, Android, architecture de sécurité, vecteurs de menaces, analyse des
risques
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INTRODUCTION
We live in the smart device era, people start use the smart device (phones and tablets) as the
main computing device in daily basis. This revolution in technologies affects every computing
system and shows the need of new systems architectures such as cloud computing and requires
new security models to protect the users’ data. Android is one of the leading platforms adopted
by smart phones industry and it has 87% of the current used smart phones in the world (87). In
fact, by the end of 2014 Android applications store “Google Play” has more than 850,000 ap-
plications with more than 40 billion download (52). Therefore, our research project focuses on
Android platform. The wide use of smart phones encourages organizations and companies to
adopt them in their enterprise solutions and to access their intra-networks. In fact smart phones
have many benefits that could help improve enterprise solutions, such as mobility which allow
immediate access to customer’s data or feed the decision makers with real time information
or provide quick feedback response. Therefore mobility can improve operational effectiveness
and visibility across value chain, reducing operational cost of an organization, and enhancing
decision making. However, when organizations start integrating smart phones to their enter-
prise solutions, they face many management and security challenges. First, the diversity of
smartphone platforms is challenging the portability of the solution on various devices, espe-
cially for “bring your own device” BYOD approaches. Second, the mobility characterizing
of smart phones make them easy to stolen which make organization data confidentiality under
risk. Third the increasing number of mobile applications vulnerabilities discovered makes the
mobile enterprise solution under high potential security risks. Indeed, the popularity of An-
droid has attracted the attention of hackers and malware developers who spent double efforts
to take advantage of smartphones vulnerabilities. In addition, the large users’ community of-
fered excellent opportunities for social engineering attacks. In fact, Google play, which is the
Android’s official market, is open to anyone to upload applications. While Google is putting
efforts to verify the uploaded applications before publication, many ’malicious’ ones succeed
to integrate the market and get downloaded by thousands of end users before being unmasked.
Consequently, the enterprise applications are executed in a hostile environment where any per-
sonal application installed by the end user can represent a source of attack! Unfortunately, the
1
2base Android security model cannot protect from or even detect many of the attack scenarios
that may threaten the security and privacy of enterprise applications.
• Objectives: The objectives of this research are the followings:
a. Understanding mobile enterprise applications and the security risks they are facing on
android mobile devices. This study includes a survey of existing security solutions
and their evaluation.
b. Experimenting security attacks on Android mobile devices. This study includes evalu-
ating the security mechanisms of android devices and building attacks exploiting them
in order to threaten enterprise applications.
c. Proposing security enhancement to better protect privacy on Android mobile devices.
The target security improvements vary from best practices to security configurations
of and modification of the middleware managing mobile devices.
• Contributions: We summarize the contributions of our work as follows.
a. we proposed a taxonomy for the enterprise mobile applications, based on which, we
surveyed the current security solutions protecting them. This study revealed the risks
facing enterprise applications on Android devices and the limitations of the proposed
solutions. The study showed the emergence of mobile virtualization and multi-persona
platforms to provide better isolation between enterprise applications and personal ones
on the same device.
b. we evaluated the security of mobile banking applications against screenshot attacks
and investigated the possible protection mechanisms to defeat them. These attacks
scenarios take advantage of password visibility feature on Android smart devices
(largely used by other mobile platforms including IOS (55). According to our knowl-
edge, this is the first research experiment testing the password visibility feature against
real attack. During the study, we have experimented more than 130 mobile banking
applications hosted on Google play store.
3c. we studied the security weaknesses of multi-persona mobile technology, more pre-
cisely Cells solution (53) which is based on OS-level virtualization. During this study,
we investigated three main attack scenarios: privacy escalation, privilege escalation
and remote management. To counter the uncovered vulnerabilities, we proposed
an SE-Policy module to secure the virtualization control management components
in Cells. In addition, we defined and integrated a new MMAC policy to defeat the
privacy escalation. Based on the proposed security mechanisms, we designed and
implemented a prototype that has been integrated to Cells.
• Organization: The remainder or the thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 1 We give
a background on the Android platform security and privacy. Then we will explain the se-
curity requirements for using the smart devices in enterprise and we will survey the current
proposed solutions to manage the security risks; in chapter 2 We present a new screenshot
attack to expose the user credential from mobile banking applications on Android platform;
in chapter 3 we will explore the security requirements and privacy of android virtualization
technology and we propose a new Middle-ware Policy to Android platform to apply more
fine grained access control on Android platform permissions; finally we explain our con-
clusion and recommendations.

CHAPTER 1
SECURING BUSINESS DATA ON ANDROID PLATFORM
1.1 Android Security
The Android platform uses the sandbox mechanism (9) to isolate applications and processes.
The sandbox refer to mechanism by which applications run with their own set of user and
group identifiers (UID and GID, respectively). The constrained manner in which applications
execute make it impossible for one application to read or write data from another. To facil-
itate information sharing and interprocess communication among applications and processes
Android platform has a set of uses-permission (6) to allows applications gain access to the
system resources. Furthermore, any application can declare and enforce permissions to share
its modules with other applications (13). The application’s enforcing permissions and uses-
permission should be declared in the application’s Manifest file (2). The application Manifest
file contains essential information about the application and it is written in XML format with
predefined tags. During the application installation process, a prompt dialog contains the ap-
plication’s required permissions (uses-permission and enforce permissions) will appear to the
smart device user, and the user should accept or reject the application installation. After appli-
cation’s installation, there is no possibility to modify or change the granted permissions to the
application.
1.2 Private Data and Android Vulnerabilities
Users store their private data such as photos and emails on the smartphone without giving
serious attention to the data’s security. The high number of malwares detected for Android
platform shows that there are weaknesses in the Android security architecture and development
environment. We will explain the terms of smartphone privacy and the main attacks threatening
them as follow.
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61.2.1 Smart Phone Privacy
a. Smartphone Identification. Smartphone identifier could be phone number, international
mobile equipment identity number (IMEI), International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI)
or SIM Card Serial Number (ICCID). Many applications use one of these unique iden-
tifiers to access their networks or check user identity. In real scenarios, these unique
identifiers are bundled with username and password to create unique user identification in
many applications. Consequently, accessing these unique identifiers facilitates attacking
users’ privacy since they are reused in other applications.
b. Physical Location. There are many applications providing Location Base Services LBS
like map navigation, nearest services identification, location sharing in social networks.
While the presence of these applications on the device is legitimate and justified, they
cannot be trusted when the device is running enterprise applications. In fact, these appli-
cations can track the user physical location and thus may threaten enterprise privacy and
even the physical safety of the user. For example, “consider a rural mobile accountant
agent who uses an enterprise application to record transactions as he goes around cus-
tomers and distribute money. Typically, any third party application that has the required
Android permissions would have access to the location information. However, when the
accountant agent is running the enterprise application, location information becomes en-
terprise sensitive data”, and thus should be accessible only to enterprise applications. This
is very important to protect the physical security of the accountant agent.
c. External Storage. Any data stored in the external memory storage is accessible to any
other application having the permissions required to access external storage. In fact, the
permissions of the majority of files stored in external storage are defined as RW or not
encrypted, thus any application can access them or even modify them.
d. Super User Access. Rooting Android means granting the user full privilege to control the
Android OS; known as root or super user access (91). The goal of rooting Smartphones
is to overcome limitations that carrier and hardware manufacture put on the device. How-
ever the problem with rooted phones is that any malware successes to gain the root user
7privilege will get full control of the Android OS. With root permissions, malware is able
to access any application’s data in the internal memory, user contact list or control the
hardware function such as WiFi, Bluetooth, GPS, etc. All these malicious activities could
happen without notifying the user.
1.2.2 Main Attacks
After specifying the user private data, we will explore the possible attacks that could expose
the user private data.
a. Privilege Escalation. Android OS use IPC mechanism (Binder) (7) to let applications
and system modules communicate with each other’s. The authors of (58) investigate
the permission escalation of IPC mechanism and showed that a possible security thread
happens when “the application with less permission is not restricted to access components
of a more permission application”. In other words, Android’s security architecture does
not ensure that a caller application is assigned at least the same permissions as a callee
application or component”. For example, an application Ax having only a permission
to access the user contacts list and there are another application Bx having a permission
to access the internet and GPS functions, through the IPC mechanism Ax could use a
component of Bx to send the user contacts list to third party server through Internet.
b. Root Kit Attack. Rootkit is software used by an attacker to gain root-level access to the
Android OS. Rootkits allow hackers to administratively control the Smartphone, which
means executing files, hiding processes, accessing logs, monitoring user activities, and
even changing the Smartphone settings like GPS, Wifi, etc. Rootkits infect the Smart-
phone by installing themselves as loaded kernel modules LKM and thus, are loaded each
time the operating system is booted up. The author of (137) shows that there is a tech-
nique to hook the system_call_ table through /dev/kmem access technique on Android
platform which makes the attacker able to inject his malicious code. The rootkit attack
in (138) shows an E-Finance service application that stores the public authentication cer-
tificate into internal saving structure in the SdCard. The rooting attack makes it possible
8to acquire manager’s authority and get access to every system file. Therefore, the at-
tacker succeeds to get this authority and become able to expose the public authentication
certificate of E-Finance service in order to use it later.
The wide use of Smart phones encourages organizations and companies to adopt them in their
enterprise solutions and to access their intra-networks. In fact smart phones have many ben-
efits that could help improve enterprise solutions, such as the mobile behavior which allow
immediate access to customer’s data or feed the decision makers with real time information
or provide quick feedback response. Therefore mobility can improve operational effectiveness
and visibility across value chain, reducing operational cost of an organization, and enhancing
decision making. However, when organizations start integrating smart phones to their enter-
prise solutions, they face many management and security challenges. First, the diversity of
smartphone platforms is challenging the portability of the solution on various devices, espe-
cially for “bring your own device” BYOD approaches. Second, the mobility characterizing
of smart phones make them easy to stolen which make organization data confidentiality under
risk. Third the increasing number of mobile applications vulnerabilities discovered make the
mobile enterprise solution under high potential security risks. In this chapter, we will classify
the uses of the enterprise mobile applications, then we will argue the security risks of the en-
terprise solutions with Android platform, and at the end we will survey and evaluate different
solutions are proposed to enhance the security of Android platform.
1.3 Enterprise Applications Taxonomy
We focus on Android platform; however the taxonomy we propose could fit on all smart phone
platforms. We adapted the enterprise mobile applications taxonomy proposed in (127). While
the taxonomy in (127) addresses the issue of developing enterprise mobile applications; our
taxonomy is security-driven. In fact, for each category of mobile applications, we discussed
the main business scenarios and identified the associated security risks depending on data con-
fidentiality and business data transactions point of view. The result presented in figure 1, a
bottom-up five-layer classification where lower layers represent applications with lower secu-
9rity risks and upper layers represent applications with higher security risks and these layers are
overlapped, these layers are as follow.
a. Public Broadcast Applications:
These applications usually broadcast static information contents or general public services
for a wide group of users, like company flayers, information about university campus,
emergency exits, etc. This kind of applications usually produce public data with limited
or without data transactions which mean low security risks in terms of data confidentiality.
b. Information Applications:
These applications are used to present products, offers, events, etc. thus they usually
have heavy data transactions between end users and the enterprise solution. In terms of
data confidentiality these applications could be used to capture the end users private data
like interest search words, GPS coordinates, network provider, etc. From the company’
side, the end user has accessibility to feed the enterprise solution with valuable data, for
example th e integrity of users’ feedback can be altered which could affect the validity
and efficiency of its processes. Those both sides of data confidentiality make the system
with high security risks to control and manage.
c. E-Finance Applications:
Applications with electronic money transaction could be a special kind of the previous
category information application. Indeed, the enterprise solution has another actor to in-
teract with rather than the end user, for example a financial mediator should be integrated
with the system to complete the money transaction operation. In terms of data confiden-
tiality the system has the same security risks as information application, however it has
new actor to interact with, which adds new security risks to manage and control.
d. Data Operation Applications:
These applications are designed to achieve complex business scenarios for which any
data operation should be performed between internal trusted users like employees and
their company systems within the company’s network. For example, applications that al-
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lowing employees to submit their timesheets and tasks. In case of “BYOD model” where
employees are allowed to use their own smartphone, these applications can represent a
source security threats for the enterprise systems. Indeed the enterprise solutions should
have ability to isolate and secure their own data transaction from the employee personal
use, which is not easy to achieve as we will see later in this paper. In terms of data con-
fidentiality the company data could be exposed through employee device, which means
high security risks to manage and control.
e. Collaborative Applications:
These applications could be considered as a special kind of the previous category “Data
Operations” however, they are designed for collaborative purpose between trusted users
such as video conference services, instance file sharing applications, etc. In terms of data
confidentiality the system has the same high security risks as the previous category but
with more complex scenarios to manage.
In terms of business work-flow transition, the first three categories could be fit under B2C
“Business to Consumer” (68) model and the last two categories could be fit under B2E “Busi-
ness to Employee” (68) model. We focus our work on the last two categories B2E.
1.4 Security Requirements
In the following we will explore the security requirements that enterprise systems need to
control the enterprise mobile applications security risks.
a. Policy Management:
- The enterprise solution should has the ability to enforce and validate a security policy to
any smartphone will communicate with it.
- Fully controlling the smartphone while it is communicating with the enterprise solution
and releasing this control once disconnected.
11
Figure 1.1 Taxonomy of Enterprise mobile Apps and their security risks
b. Data Isolation:
- Enterprise solution should provide data isolation between its own stored data and other
personal data of the user.
c. Data Encryption:
- Provide encryption function for data and commands.
d. Secure Communication:
- Establishing secure communication parameters between the smartphone and enterprise
solutions are required.
e. Easy Integration:
- Ensuring smooth integration with existing systems.
f. Performance and Overhead:
- Introducing as less overhead as possible on the smartphone and on the enterprise solution
architecture.
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1.5 Security Solutions from Academia
In the following, we will explore and evaluate the most common academic ideas that proposed
to enhance the security of enterprise mobile application usage.
1.5.1 Trust Droid
Trust Droid (59) is a proposed solution to provide data isolation and applications policy man-
agement at different layers of the Android software stack. Trust Droid assumes that the enter-
prise networks are trusted and the employee is trusted. However, smartphones are generally
not trusted because employees are prone to security critical errors such as installing malware
or disabling security features. The main idea of Trust Droid is to classify the applications
into three predefined categories; or “Colouring them” as the authors mentioned (59). The first
category gathers per-installed system applications like the content providers and services, the
second category is trusted third party applications provided by the enterprise systems, and the
third category is dedicated to untrusted third party applications such as any application installed
by the employee for personal use. This classification is performed by checking the application
certificate at installation time. Based on this classification, each application will run under its
category’s policy where the untrusted applications cannot access resources or communicate
with applications belonging to the trusted categories. Trust Droid provides mandatory access
control MAC (77) for each category domain to control files accessing and sharing. In addition,
Trust Droid provides a firewall to control network sockets and Internet protocol; the firewall
rules are based on the policy of each category. Evaluation: from security perspective Trust
Droid could be vulnerable to runtime attacks like buffer overflow because the TCB model of
Trust Droid assumes that the low level system layer is secure. In addition, if an adversary
identifies vulnerabilities in one of these pre installed applications, he could break the domain
isolation and get access to data belonging to trust applications. Trust Droid has other weak-
nesses in managing enterprise dynamic data, for example it cannot prevent an enterprise ap-
plication from uploading personal files, also managing categories policy limited to application
development phase, and it cannot be updated after installation which limits the evolution of the
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solution over time. From performance perspective, based on section 5.2 of (59), Trust Droid
introduces acceptable performance overhead. Finally, there is no data encryption functionality
to be managed by the solution.
1.5.2 Unified Security Enhancement Framework
Authors of Unified Security Enhancement Framework (97) propose a unified and effective
kernel-level framework to secure the Android OS by introducing three mechanisms: first is
Root Privilege Protection (RPP) which keeps track of a list of trusted programs with root priv-
ileges, second is Resource Misuse Protection (RMP) which keeps track of important system
resources that are vital in the Android OS and finally Private Data Protection (PDP) which dis-
allows trusted programs to access sensitive data through enforcing the least privilege principle
in the permission based access control. Evaluation: from security perspective the framework
was evaluated by conducting three experiments based on three malicious behaviors, first one
is gaining root access, second is changing system resources such as configuration files which
is always target by attacker, last one is trying to access user private data such as contact list.
The framework succeeded to prevent all these attacks; however the framework just narrows
the threats attacks possibilities because any malicious application installed by super user can
inherit all root access. The RMP mechanism restriction related to phone configuration itself
which cannot be modified by any application and contradict the case in the enterprise applica-
tions which need more flexibility to prevent conflicts between applications. The system does
not have remote management capabilities for installed applications. The performance showed
in section 5 (97) that monitoring files and system calls by the framework component increase
the overhead by almost 25% average rather than the normal Android OS.
1.5.3 Polite Policy Framework
The proposed idea of polite policy framework (94) is to control applications behavior at exe-
cution time. Indeed, developers use a modified API to provision security at the build phase of
the application which enables polite framework to achieve fine grained policy control as well
as be easily adopted in the mobile application development life cycle. Policies are dynamically
14
fetched from an enterprise policy server at runtime which gives the enterprise administrators
high management capabilities. When an enterprise application starts, the system creates a
parallel thread that monitors the phone state and stops or kills the application if the enterprise
policies are not met. The advantage in this solution is that the enterprise policy is enforced only
during the enterprise applications executions time; thus, the personal use of the device will not
be affected. Evaluation: from security perspective, the solution has two types of policies; first
is API level policy which manages the device resources such as GPS, WiFi, etc. and the sec-
ond is application level policy which manages the data flow. Also Polite framework gives the
developer data encryption functionalities to secure enterprise data and perform remote device
wipe functionality for device stolen case. However, the policy classification does not prevent
system component itself to be exploited under root access attack or privilege escalation attack.
Another weak point is the enterprise application itself is responsible for the communication
with the policy server and policy enforcement! That could lead to policy conflict between the
enterprise applications and it could increase threats on policy server. For performance, section
VI-c (94) shows that polite framework takes 6% more time than normal native library command
execution.
1.5.4 CRêPE
CRêPE (62) is a solution for Enforcing Fine-Grained Context-Related Policies on Android.
It acts as a security mechanism in addition to the standard Android security and allows users
and other predefined trusted parties to define context-related policies which can be installed,
updated, and applied at runtime. These policies can be applied in a fine-grained manner, e.g.
for each application the context-related policy consists of two types of policies:
a. Access control policy: access rules that use the XACML standard (100).
b. Obligation policy: specifies the actions that should be done such as activate or disable a
system resource like GPS, Wifi, camera or start and stop applications.
The system component manages policies check at all android stack layers: application layer,
framework layer, and kernel layer. Moreover, the user is able to manage policies rules, i.e.,
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“create, update and delete” locally form the device (through GUI applications) or remotely via
SMS message, Bluetooth and QR-code using public key infrastructure PKI schema. Evalua-
tion: CRêPE extends the permission check mechanism in android OS by adding further checks
to the current active CRêPE policy, this approach can be considered as prevention of privilege
escalation attacks. Also CRêPE has CRePEIPTables component which is working in the ker-
nel level as firewall to filter the network access. However there are two weaknesses in this
solution; first defining the policy depends on the user orientation of security needs which is not
enough due to the user miss understand of security risks; second CRêPE protects the communi-
cation between its components by PKI system using X.509 certificates stored as root authority,
a rootkit attack as described in (138) will be able to expose the authentication certificate and
the system will be vulnerable to any income message. For performance, Section VI-B in (62)
shows that policy activation and deactivation overhead is influenced by the number of conflict
rules defined in the policy, but the overall efficiency overhead is acceptable.
1.5.5 SE for Android
Android has a Linux Kernel OS and thus it relies on the Linux discretionary access control
(DAC) to implement the permission model of Android security architecture. Indeed, Android
uses DAC in two ways:
a. Sandboxing technique to provide data and code execution isolation between applica-
tions (9).
b. Authorizing applications to access system resources like Wifi, GPS, etc.
Security Enhanced Linux (SE Linux) (77) was originally developed as a Mandatory Access
Control (MAC) mechanism for Linux. The goal of MAC is to allow the OS constraining the
ability of a subject/initiator to access or generally perform some sorts of operation on an objec-
t/target depending on a wide set of rules. Evaluation: Authors of (120) evaluate SE Android by
investigating previously published malwares and vulnerabilities. Regards to the root exploits
malwares, SE-Android is able to prevent some of applied rootkit attacks such as Ginger Master
(15) and Zimperlich (118). However, the SE-Android is not able to prevent other attack such
16
as KillingInTheNameOf and psneuter exploits (16). Regarding the application layer vulnera-
bilities, SE-Android provides an effective means of preventing applications from performing
privilege escalation attacks and unauthorized data sharing through kernel interfaces. However,
SE-Android has some limitations that should be considered. First, the effectiveness of its se-
curity depends on the defined policy which means SE-Android cannot mitigate anything not
defined in the policy rules. Second, SE-Android was not able to mitigate Kernel level vulnera-
bilities applied by rootkit attacks. Third, SE-Android cannot protect against threats originating
from shared hardware resources. For performance, the SE-Android overhead was negligible
compared with normal Android OS.
1.5.6 L4Android
L4Android (96) is a microkernel derived from the L4Linux (95). L4Android created by adding
the required code for Android platform to the L4Linux components. L4Android divides the OS
kernel functions into small components, each component implements one basic service and is
equipped with only permissions needed for its correct operation. The goal of L4Android is to
run the Android platform as a virtual machine on the top of the microkernel. Thus the smart-
phone can run two Android OS; one will be use for personal purpose and the other will be use
for business purpose. Evaluation: Virtualization provides high domain data isolation between
business partition and personal partition as long as the business partition is not infected. For
policy management perspective, the enterprise system will need to apply different policies on
the business platform as there are many use cases. For performance, L4Android has more ex-
ecution time than the normal the Android OS and related to (1) it has performance issues with
graphic driver components. There are many hypervisor developed to achieve the same domain
data isolation technique like Xen (76), KVM (64) and OK4L Android (66). Virtualization pro-
vides secure environment and data isolation. However, the performance, power efficiency and
implementation coast will be barriers to be applied.
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1.5.7 Improving Security with OS-Level Virtualization
Linux Containers (LXC) (65) is a lightweight OS level virtualization that isolates processes
and resources without the need to provide instruction interpretation mechanisms and other
complexities of full virtualization such as the hypervisor virtualization mechanism. Authors of
(130) provide a user-space container to isolate and control the resources of single applications
or groups of applications running on top of the Android OS kernel. This typically includes a
unique hostname, process identifiers (PIDs), inter process communications (IPC), a file system,
and network resources. Evaluation: The major advantage of OS-level virtualization technique
compared to full system virtualization is sharing the kernel layer between different containers
decrease the virtualization overhead meanwhile provides isolation between user-spaces’ data
and process execution. The system has a remote management component integrated within the
kernel level so it is isolated from Android user-space. Also encryption functionality could be
integrated at the user-space level to encrypt the file system or by a file basis. For performance,
in section-9 at (131) the evaluation test shows that negligible performance overhead happen
compared with the original Android OS performance.
1.5.8 Matrix of Proposed Solutions and Security Requirements
In this matrix we relate the proposed solutions’ features with the suggested functions to cover
security risks we considered. We used three symbols: (−) mean this function is weak or does
not exist, (∗) mean this function has good implementation, (+) mean this function needs more
enhancement.
1.6 Security Solutions from Industry
Many smartphone manufacture, telecommunication providers and security solution companies
start collaborate together to provide a complete secure solutions for managing smartphone in
Enterprise systems using the same ideas as we presented in section 4. Samsung, one of these
smartphone manufactures, provides a complete solution for secure smartphone management
in enterprise system named KNOX. KNOX (113) is an Android based solution built on the
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Table 1.1 MMAC Policy Tags and Description
Policy
Manage-
ment
Data Iso-
lation
Data En-
cryption
Secure
Commu-
nication
Easy Inte-
gration
Performance
and Over-
head
Trust
Droid
+ ∗ − ∗ + −
Security
enhance-
ment
frame-
work
− + − + − +
Polite
Policy
Frame-
work
∗ + ∗ − ∗ +
CRêPE ∗ ∗ − ∗ + +
SE-
Android
∗ + − + + +
L4Android + ∗ − − − +
OS-Level
Virtual-
ization
+ ∗ − + + ∗
integration between hardware layer using Trust Zone (TZ) technology (56) with software layer
using SE for Android and Android Containers technology. The advantage of using TZ tech-
nology is partitioning the memory and CPU resources into a “secure” and “normal” world,
which allow TZ based Integrity Measurement Architecture (TIMA) to continuously monitor
the integrity of the Linux kernel. TIMA runs in the secure-world and cannot be disabled, while
the SE for Android Linux kernel runs in the “normal” world. The Android Container provides
isolation between the enterprise programs operation environment and other programs operation
environment like the OS level virtualization solution we discussed in previous section. Finally,
the system has data encryption function that allows enterprise IT administrators to encrypt
data on the entire device and has virtual private network (VPN) support to establish secure
communications. There are other companies providing secure enterprise mobile solutions like
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VMware (129) and TrendMicro (102), however all these solutions still new in the industry and
need times to be evaluated.

CHAPTER 2
CAPTURE-ME : ATTACKING THE USER CREDENTIAL IN MOBILE BANKING
APPLICATIONS
Mobile banking is a service that allows the customers of financial institutions to conduct a
number of financial transactions such as pay bills and transfer money through a smart device.
Moreover financial institutions use the mobile banking service to inform their customers about
the new services and offers they provide. The mobile applications vulnerabilities and secu-
rity threats that discovered and reported every year (39) make the financial institutions pay
attention to their mobile banking service security and safety. A few studies have shown that
the smart phone screen is vulnerable to privacy exposer by using the spying attack such as
`` iSpy´´ (108) and `` fast eavesdropping attack´´ (101) or by applying screenshot attack such as
`` Screenmilker´´ (99). These attacks were able to expose the user typing data due to the ad-
vantage of the keystroke animation feature on smart phone keyboards. Figure 2.1 shows the
keystroke animation feature. The screenshot attack Screenmilker used the keystroke ani-
Figure 2.1 Keystroke Animation Feature on Keyboards
mation feature to expose the user credential data (user name and password), contacts list and
social applications posts. However, these attacks either screenshot attack or spying attack will
fail if the keystroke animation feature is disabled by the user or in smart devices with screen
size more than 6 inches, such as tablets where the keystroke animation feature is disabled by
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default. In this chapter we introduce a new screenshot attack, Capture-Me , to expose the user
credential (user id and password) by using the advantage of the password visibility feature on
Android platform. The password visibility feature controls whether passwords typed into the
smart device are visible on screen, or hidden by replacing the letters with dots. The smart de-
vice users usually have difficulty with typing letters accurately using the on-screen keyboard.
The password visibility feature will give a visual feedback on-screen in the password text field.
The password visibility feature shows the typed letter for 0.5 to 1 sec (depending on the user
typing speed) and then convert the letter to a dot. Figure2.2 shows the password visibility fea-
ture on a mobile banking application. Most of the mobile apps required a login procedure to
Figure 2.2 Password Visibility Feature
let the user use its features and services. However, mobile apps are swinging between security
and usability. Mobile apps such as social networks, email, chat, etc., give more attention to the
usability rather than security. These kinds of apps only require the user to enter her credential
(user id and password) at the first time the application runs. Then, the application stores the
user credential in the data directories and the user will not need to enter her credential the next
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time the application runs. Nevertheless mobile banking apps pay more attention to security and
require the user to enter her credential (user-id and password) every time the mobile banking
application runs. Even with the remember me option the user require to enter her password ev-
ery time the application runs. Capture-Me focuses its attack on mobile banking apps because
of the repetition of entering the user credential (user id and password) which increases the at-
tack success space. Capture-Me will take a series of screenshot images while the user enters
her credential in the mobile banking application and apply OCR analysis on those screenshot
images using the tesseract-ocr engine. The tesseract-ocr (85) is one of the most accurate open
source OCR engines and is used in many mobile apps such as (111) and (126) to recognize text
from images. Tesseract-ocr engine is an independent platform, it runs on Android, IOS and
could be compiled to run on other platforms such as windows phone. One of the key features
in tesseract-ocr is the training procedure (31) to support languages other than English. In fact,
the training procedure feature is the advantage that makes Capture-Me use the tesseract-ocr
engine instead of use any other OCR engine such as Ocrad (67) or GOCR (117). We used the
tesseract training procedure to create a new language dataset, which consisted of the English
language letters, password masking character (dots) and keyboard cursor (vertical bar), and
named it as password language. Capture-Me combined the tesseract engine with the password
language dataset to expose the user credential data during the OCR analysis phase. We will
show later in 2.2.4 the procedure of the training process and the needs of our new password lan-
guage dataset. Our development of Capture-Me attack shows that most of the mobile banking
apps in Google play store are vulnerable to Capture-Me attack and they did not implement the
basic security protection mechanism to defeat the screenshot attack. We explore the possible
protection mechanisms to defeat the Capture-Me attack with more than 130 mobile banking
apps hosted on Google play store.
2.1 Screenshot Functionality
Smart device users mainly take screenshots for social activities and for that reason many screen-
shot applications such as Screenshot UX (121) and Screenshot Ultimate (86) have high down-
load rates and good reviews on Google Play store. Before we explain how these screenshot
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applications work on Android platforms, we will give a brief introduction about the Android
Graphics framework.
2.1.1 Frame Buffer FB
Linux Frame buffer (128) is an abstract component that provides access to the graphical output
from the graphic hardware device. Android relies on a standard frame buffer deriver which
exists in the root directory of the Android platform under dev/fb0 or dev/graphics/fb0. The
fb0 directory is only accessible by the root user and graphics group’s users. The output of FB
consists of the screen pixel data and its format, which requires doing an I/O ioct (17) control
operation to extract the fb0 data. In more technical details, the frame buffer has front and back
buffers. The front buffer has pixel data of the current surface presented on the screen, and the
back buffer is used for composition by the surface flinger service(50).
2.1.2 Application Surface view
Each application window on the Android platform has its own surface view (51), which holds
the pixel data that are being composited to the screen. The displayed screen holds many appli-
cations’ surfaces, like the foreground application activity, the status bar and the navigation bar.
All these application surfaces are managed and displayed on the screen by the surface flinger
service.
2.1.3 Surface Flinger service
The surface flinger (50) is a wide composition engine that runs as a daemon system service on
the Android platform to perform the main following functions: 1) Composite multiple surfaces
in a single frame buffer 2) Pass the composite frame buffer to one or more displays 3) Manage
and synthesize the composite buffer allocation and data. When an application comes to the
foreground; the surface flinger communicates with the window manager (40) service to receive
the window status (visibility, z-order) and communicate with the activity manager (35) service
to receive the foreground activity status. These communications are done via binder inter-
face ISurfaceComposer(104) which help the surface flinger to collect the required data before
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compose the frame buffer. Figure 2.3 shows the sequence diagram of surface flinger service
operations. Moreover, the surface flinger is not available to third party applications. Only
required system services or system signed applications with ACCESS_SURFACE_FLINGER
permission (33) are able to communicate with the surface flinger service.
Figure 2.3 Surface Flinger Service sequence diagram
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2.1.4 Screenshot implementation on Android
There are two techniques to take a screenshot image on the Android platform; a) by using the
Screencap command (54) which is a native system function b) by executing an I/O ioctl on the
frame buffer (dev/graphics/fb0) to read the current active display screen frame buffer data.
a. Screencap: Screencap is a command line function in the Android framework, which
allows authorized system applications and the Android Debug Bridge ADB (3) to take a
screenshot image. In more detail, the Screencap command communicates with the surface
flinger service through the ScreenShotClient object to read the frame buffer of the active
screen. Only authorized system applications, ADB, and any process that has a super user
permission are able to execute the Screencap command.
b. FB deviec (dev/graphics/fb0): Before Android 4.x versions, the Screencap function did
not exist. For that reason many screenshot applications such as screenshot library (89)
develop their own implementation to access the fb0 and read the frame buffer data of the
displayed screen on Android platform 2.x versions.
2.1.5 ScreenShot Applications
We choose the four most downloaded screenshot applications on the Google play store and
performed a reverse engineering on each one of them using apktool (88) and JAD GUI (69)
to discover how they get access to the Screencap function or FB device. Table 2.1 shows
the screenshot applications that have the highest download rate in Google play store. We
Table 2.1 The highest Downloaded Screenshot Applications
Application Name Download Rate Feedback
ScreenShot UX 10,000,000-50,000,000 4.3 star
ScreenShot Ultimate 5,000,000-10,000,000 3.9 star
ScreenShot 10,000,000-50,000,000 3.6 star
ScreenShot Easy 1,000,000 - 5,000,000 4.3 star
installed these applications on different Android platform versions: Android 2.3.6 unrooted/-
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rooted, Android 4.1 unrooted/rooted and Android 4.4.2 unrooted/rooted. We found that all of
these applications use different techniques to take a screenshot image depending on the running
environment platform.
• On Android 2.3 unrooted phones: these applications rely on an ADB vulnerability in
Android 2.3 platform, which lets the user run a native executable service on the smart
device with ADB signature. The procedure for this technique consists of 3 steps:
a. Install the screenshot application from play store.
b. Connect the smart device to the user PC through USB connection then download and
run a support patch by the screenshot application.
c. The screen shot application will communicate with the native service through TCP
socket connection to retrieve the frame buffer data.
Moreover, we performed a reverse engineer on the support patch of the screenshot applica-
tions and we found that this patch consists of an executable file and a shell script. The shell
script contains the ADB commands to copy the executable file to the smart device then
executes it to run as a native service. The native service will get access to the frame buffer
device (the dev/graphic/fb0 file) as the owner of the native service process is the ADB (3).
• On Android 4.1, 4.3, 4.4 unrooted phones: some of these applications mentioned in their
description on Google play store they might work using the same technique as Android 2.3
unrooted platform, but all our trails on Nexus 7, Nexus 10 and Samsung Galaxy Note 10
did not work, as many Xda developer forums mentioned (84) (57).
• On Android 2.3 rooted phones: Screenshot applications use the ADB vulnerability method.
They can also rely on the super user’s (91) permission to gain access to the frame buffer
device fb0 and execute their own implementation of reading the frame buffer data.
• On Android 4.1, 4.3, 4.4 rooted phones: Screenshot applications rely on the super user’s
permission to execute the Screencap command or to gain direct access to the frame buffer
device fb0. Some of these applications ask the user to perform ADB vulnerability tech-
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nique, however the ADB should gain the super user’s permission to be able to copy and
execute the native service. Table 2.2 shows a matrix of all Android platforms we tested and
the corresponding screenshot techniques that work with them.
Table 2.2 Matrix of Screenshot techniques and relative Android Platform
Android
2.3
Android
2.3 Rooted
Android
4.x
Android
4.x Rooted
ADB TCP
Method
* * - *
ScreenCap
function
- - - *
Direct access
to fb0
- * - *
2.2 Design and Implementation
Capture-Me runs as a background service on the Android platform to perform the following
actions:
a. Monitor the current foreground application on the smart device
b. Take the right screenshot when the user starts entering her credentials on the mobile bank-
ing applications.
c. Perform an OCR analysis on the taken screenshot images to extract the user credentials.
d. Send the extracted user credentials to the attacker server.
2.2.1 Attack scenario
In our attack model, we consider an adversary who can disguise Capture-Me in his attractive
app or convince the user to install Capture-Me as a separate mandatory application component
to run his app (Many applications on Android Play Store required the user to install dependency
component as another application hosted on the Play store). Capture-Me required Internet
access permission to send the extracted user credential to the attacker server and the user should
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have installed at least one of the targeted mobile banking applications. Figure 2.4 typically
shows Capture-Me threat scenario steps.
Figure 2.4 Capture-Me Attack Scenario
2.2.2 Preliminary Design Considerations
We analyzed six mobile banking applications and the PayPal mobile application (as Paypal is a
financial institution) to investigate these applications operation steps and behavior. Capture-Me
will target those chosen mobile banking applications to test the attack scenario. The mobile
application package name is a unique identifier, Capture-Me relies on it to detect whether the
target mobile banking application is invoked and placed on the foreground display to start cap-
turing the screenshot images. Capture-Me has the mobile banking applications package names
in its configurations. During the analysis of the chosen mobile banking apps, we found some
of these apps work in the off-line mode (i.e., without requiring an Internet connection); they
start with showing the login screen, and after the user enters her credentials, they check for the
Internet connectivity. Other apps only work if there is an Internet connection. This information
helps Capture-Me to decide the right time to take the screenshot image. Furthermore, in the
login screen of each mobile banking application we checked the user id types (i.e: card num-
ber, user name or email) and validate the password text field length. Some of those apps have
a length validation on the password text field and others do not. The password text field length
information helps Capture-Me to determine the exact password length as there are some mobile
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banking applications required the user for 6-8 password characters. Relevant information from
the selected mobile banking apps are summarized in Table 2.3.
Table 2.3 List of Selected Bank Applications
Application Name Package Name Password field Length User ID
CIBC Bank App
com.cibc
.android.mobi
12 chars Card number
BMO Bank App com.bmo .mobile 6 chars Card number
Natioanl Bank App ca.bnc .android 26 chars Card number
RBC Mobile Bank
App
com.rbc
.mobile.android
32 chars
Card number
/ User name
ScotiaBank App
com. -scotiabank
.mobile
More than 50 chars Card number
TD Canada Bank App com.td 32 char
Card number
/ User name
PayPal App
com.paypal .android
.p2pmobile
More than 50 chars Email address
2.2.3 Monitoring and Screen Capture Phases
Android platform has useful resources we can use to identify the current foreground applica-
tion process such as the Top command (98), which gives continual reports about the running
processes in the Android system. By examining the usage of the CPU and memory, we can
identify the current foreground application. However, the easiest technique to identify the fore-
ground application process is to check the IMPORTANCE FOREGROUND (11) attribute of
application process that can be found in the applications processes list in the activity manager
service (35). Capture-Me monitors the current foreground application process by using the
activity manager technique. When the foreground application package name matches one of
the target mobile banking apps,Capture-Me initiates the screen capture phase. We incorpo-
rate all existing screenshot capturing techniques (see Section 2.1) in Capture-Me , and based
on the detected working environment, Capture-Me selects the best technique to use. We also
analyze the performance of each technique with our experimental devices on two different An-
droid platforms by measuring the required time to take a screenshot image and store it on the
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Capture-Me directories; see Table 2.4. The screenshot image size depends on three factors; 1)
Table 2.4 Time required for screenshot Technique on different Android platforms
Android 2.3.6 HTC Desire
HD
Android 4.4.2 Nexus 10
ADB, TCP Socket
technique
1 sec 1.1 sec
ScreenCap technique - 1.4 sec
Direct access to fb0
technique
0.6 sec 0.8 sec
the device screen size, 2) the target application window content (images and colors) and 3) the
image resolution. We run the screen capture phase in Capture-Me multiple times with different
image parameters (e.g; resolution and dpi) to adjust the best suitable image size and quality
that Capture-Me can take. The average screenshot image size is between 80–140 KB with a
resolution of 2560 x 1600, and 15–70 KB with a resolution of 480 x 800 in Nexus 10 and HTC
Desire HD, respectively. Capture-Me stores the screenshot images that are taken from every
session in different directories until the OCR analysis phase is completed.
2.2.4 OCR Analysis Phase
Capture-Me starts the OCR analysis phase after the target mobile banking application is termi-
nated. The tesseract-ocr engine (85) works in a step-by-step manner to extract the text from the
image file as figure2.5 shows. The first step is to convert the given image file to a binary image.
Next step is to determine the text layout e.g; horizontal or vertical and left or right. Then the
connected component analysis step is responsible for determining and extracting the charac-
ters outlines. In the finding lines and words step, the characters outlines will convert to blobs.
These blobs are organized horizontally as the text lines and the blobs lines and regions are
divided into fixed areas or are relative to the text size. Then the word recognition occurs in two
passes; during the first pass, an attempt is made to recognize each word from the given blobs.
Each word that is satisfactorily recognized will pass as training data to an adaptive classifier.
The adaptive classifier enhances the text recognition in a more accurate manner. In the sec-
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ond pass, as the adaptive classifier has now learned new things about the words and characters
shapes from the previous pass, the second pass is to resolve various issues and to re-recognize
the skipped text from the first pass. More details regarding every phase are available at (123)
and (122).
Figure 2.5 Block Digram of Tesseract OCR Architecture
2.2.4.1 Password language
Initially Capture-Me used the tesseract-ocr engine with the English language dataset to extract
the user credential (User ID and password) from the taken screenshot images. Although it suc-
ceeded to extract the User ID, it failed to extract the password characters with high error rates.
When investigating the challenges that the tesseract-ocr engine faces with password charac-
ters there are two points to consider: (a) the password masking character and keyboard cursor
are special characters and they are not considered in the English language dataset and (b) the
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keyboard cursor appears so close to the typed character that it prevents the tesseract-ocr engine
from recognizing the difference between the typed character and the keyboard cursor. To better
extract the password characters, we designed a new language data set to use with the tesseract-
ocr engine and called it the password language. Letters in the password language consist of
English letters, some of the most used special characters (e.g :$), the password masking char-
acter and the keyboard cursor character, both in different shapes and sizes. Table 2.5 shows the
different shapes of the keyboard cursor, password masking characters and their corresponding
Unicode.
Table 2.5 Password masking and keyboard cursor shapes
Password Masking Keyboard Cursor
· U+0387 | U+2758
· U+00B7 | U+007C
· U+00b7 | U+2016
• U+2022 | U+2225
• Valid Words: In the password language, there are several restrictions on the valid word:
any word cannot have more than one English letter; a word may consist of a keyboard cursor
character and at least a password masking character; the word containing the first typed
character in the password text field, consists of an English letter and the keyboard cursor
character. Finally, we included some reserved words that exist in any mobile banking app
login screen such as Login, password, remember me and card number. Figure 2.6 shows
different samples of password language words.
• Tesseract-ocr training procedure: An important feature of the tesseract-ocr engine is the
training procedure to support languages other than the English language. Before we start
the training procedures, we setup the password language dataset and the words dictionary
into text files to be an input to the training procedure. The training procedure guide is well
explained at (31), we will briefly describe the training procedure steps as follows:
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Figure 2.6 Sample of Password Language Words
a. Generate Training Images: The tesseract-ocr engine creates a text image from the
given language text with a specific font. For each new font, tesseract recommends
that a new image file be generated. We trained tesseract with three different fonts
(Arial, Courier and Georgia) to improve the output result.
b. Create Box Files: The information about the Bounding Boxes for all the characters
present in the training image is generated in the box file.
c. Run Tesseract for Training: For each training image and box file pairs, the tesseract-
ocr engine runs in training mode to fix any error in the generated box file data.
d. Compute Character Set: For new languages, a character set file is required to specify
the information like digits, uppercase, lowercase, etc.
e. Font Properties setting: The font family attributes should be specified in the training
data.
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f. Clustering: clusters the generated language characters shapes into prototypes.
g. Data Dictionary (Optional): The language dictionary helps the tesseract-ocr engine to
decide the likelihood of different possible character combinations. Tesseract can use
up to 8 dictionary files.
h. Define Ambiguity Rules (Unicharambigs): unicharambigs file allows removing the
intrinsic ambiguity between two similar looking characters or their combinations by
using a substitution rule. We designed several ambiguities rules from some initial ex-
perimentation on the password language. For example, the tesseract-ocr engine might
recognize “n|” as “ri”, which contradicts our password language word characteristics
(i.e., any word must contain only one English letter). Table 2.6 shows the ambiguities
rules we designed (=mandatory, =non-mandatory).
Table 2.6 Set of Password Language Ambiguities Rules
Ambiguities rules Substitution
A| 4 
r| n 
a| d 
L| U 
l 1 
ri n 
q| d 
i. Generate the Language File: Final step is to combine all generated files into a sin-
gle file with the extension (file.data). The password language data file is named as
pwd.data. Figure 2.7 shows the typical training producers steps.
2.2.4.2 Tesseract-ocr output
Most mobile banking application login windows have a simple design and contain few words to
extract as (e.g; sign in, remember my card, card number,..etc), Capture-Me relies on this simple
design to identify the password word and card number, both length and position. Figure 2.8
36
Figure 2.7 Training Data procedure Block Digram
shows a screenshot image from the Scotia bank mobile app and the output from the OCR
analysis phase. For every output text extracted from a screenshot image, Capture-Me counts
the password mask characters to identify the password length and matches the extracted letter
with its position in the password word. The card number or user name label always exists on
the top of card number text field (see figure 2.9), and in other apps existing in the card number
text field at the initial state. Capture-Me follows the card number/user name label to identify
the card number/user name.
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Figure 2.8 Output of OCR Analysis Phase
Figure 2.9 TB mobile banking app login window
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2.2.5 Implementation optimizations
Finally to keep Capture-Me hidden in the victim device and improve the attack result, we per-
form the following optimizations: (a) We found that the screenshot images of two different
sessions from the same user using the same mobile banking application are almost identical.
We modified the implementation of Capture-Me to delay the screenshot function execution
by 0.5 msec in the second session. This delay helped Capture-Me to take a different screen-
shot image in the second session. (b) We register Capture-Me with the system AlarmManager
service(36) to re-start Capture-Me even if it is terminated by the Android system. (c) Capture-
Me stores the sceenshot images without any file extension to be hidden from the media gallery
apps. (d) Capture-Me performs the OCR analysis when the device screen is locked, to com-
pletely hide any performance degradation (if noticeable) by users. (e) Capture-Me maintains
the device storage by deleting the screenshot images session directory after the OCR analysis
is done.
2.3 Evaluation and Performance
The typing speed on smart devices is variant for different users (cf. (115), (75)). When the user
typed an unfamiliar password in the chosen mobile banking applications, Capture-Me was able
to extract a 10-character password from the first time the user entered her UserID-password
pair. However, after applying the attack scenario many times with a familiar password typed
by the user, Capture-Me requires at least two sessions to extract each pair of User ID and
password.
2.3.1 Evaluation Test
We decided to challenge Capture-Me with a strong password to check the effectiveness of our
attack scenario. We typed 30 different 10-character passwords more than fifty times to evaluate
Capture-Me with real user typing speed. Each password contained five lower-case letters and
an upper-case letter, three digits, and a special character, e.g; Alq012$uvn. We typed a UserID-
password pair, in all mobile banking applications for three sessions in the experimental devices
39
(Nexus 10 and HTC Desire HD). Table 2.7 shows the average number of password characters
that Capture-Me succeeded to extract from 30 different passwords in each mobile banking app
within each session. Appendix I contains the results of the experimental test. The experimental
Table 2.7 Avg Number of password characters extracted on Nexus 10 and HTC Desire
HD in three sessions
Nexus 10
Bank Name Session 1 Session 2 Session 3
CIBC Bank 7.2/10 9.5/10 10/10
BMO Bank 3.9/6 6/6 -
Natioanl Bank 4.9/8 8/8 -
RBC Bank 7.3/10 9.5/10 10/10
Scotia Bank 7.2/10 9.5/10 10/10
TD Canada Bank 7.3/10 9.5/10 10/10
PayPal 7.3/10 9.6/10 10/10
HTC Desire HD
Bank Name Session 1 Session 2 Session 3
CIBC Bank 6.8/10 9.3/10 10/10
BMO Bank 3.6/6 5.9/6 6/6
Natioanl Bank 4.6/8 7.9/8 8/8
RBC Bank 7.0/10 9.4/10 10/10
Scotia Bank 7.0/10 9.5/10 10/10
TD Canada Bank 6.9/10 9.4/10 10/10
PayPal 7.1/10 9.5/10 10/10
result shows that Capture-Me was able to extract the User-ID and at least six of the password
characters from the first session. In the second session Capture-Me was successful extract
most of the passwords. However, there are some passwords Capture-Me takes three sessions
to successfully extract them. In fact, Capture-Me takes three sessions to extract passwords that
have repeated letters such as P$ppppp234 or Hhhhh@123h as it is faster to type the same letter
multiple times. However, for strong passwords it is recommended that the passwords do not
contain letter repetition, we tried these passwords mainly to challenge Capture-Me . Capture-
Me was able to extract more password characters in the Nexus 10 device rather than the HTC
desire HD device. This is explained by the fact that the user typing speed on tablet devices
is slower than the one on smart phones. According to our experimental test results, Capture-
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Me shows a high success rate of password characters extraction. For example, if the user has
a password of 12 characters, Capture-Me needs three sessions to fully extract the password.
Figure 2.10 illustrates the ratio of password characters extraction per session.
Figure 2.10 Password characters extraction Ratio
• OCR analysis on bank websites: We extend the Capture-Me evaluation to apply the at-
tack scenario on the targeted banks websites. We used the Chrome browser on the Nexus
10 device to apply the attack scenario; Figure 2.11 shows the output of the OCR analysis
phase on the TD website screenshot image. Capture-Me was able from the first session to
extract the URL of the bank website, the User ID and 4 characters from the password. The
rich content of the website was somewhat challenging for Capture-Me in terms of screen-
shot image size (compared to the relatively simple design of app widgets). In addition, the
rich content of the website also challenged the performance of the tesseract-ocr engine in
Android. Capture-Me faced the challenge of deciding the right time to take the screenshot
image of the target website. For mobile apps Capture-Me relied on the application pack-
age name and sequence of operations to take the right screenshot image see section 2.2.3.
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Figure 2.11 OCR analysis on TD bank’s website
However, for the bank websites Capture-Me instantly took a screenshot image from the
upper part of the screen which contains the website URL, then applies the OCR-Analysis
at runtime. We decided to let Capture-Me take a screenshot image from the upper part of
the screen to enhance the OCR-Analysis performance (as small images take less time for
the tesseract-ocr engine to analyze). The output of the OCR-Analysis will be compared
with target website URL to start taking the right screenshot image.
2.3.2 Performance
As Capture-Me goes through different phases to complete the attack scenario, we evaluate the
Capture-Me performance in each phase individually. In the Capture-Me monitoring phase,
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Figure 2.12 A screenshot image of the screen upper part and its OCR-Analysis output
the device is in screen-on state and the user runs any other application rather than the target
mobile banking apps. In the Capture-Me capturing phase, the user uses one of the targeted
mobile banking apps causing Capture-Me to actively take screenshot images. In the OCR-
Analysis phase, the device is in screen-lock state and Capture-Me extracts the user credential
from the taken screenshot images. We run the CPU monitor tool (70) in the nexus 10 device
for 60 secs in each state with/without Capture-Me actively running. Figure 2.13 shows the
average usage of the CPU in the Nexus 10 device with/without Capture-Me running during the
different device states. Capture-Me shows small changes in CPU usage during the device’s
Figure 2.13 The CPU average usage
different states and in fact we did not notice any degradation of the device performance while
Capture-Me was actively running.
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2.4 Protection and Mitigation
Since Capture-Me uses different techniques to capture the screenshot images, we will explore
the possible protection and mitigation mechanisms relative to each technique.
• Protection against the Screencap command: As we explained in the background section
2.1 Screencap command relies on the surface flinger service to take a screenshot image. The
Android software development kit SDK provides the third party applications with a security
flag `` flag_ secure´´ (45) to protect the application window (the activity object) from being
captured by the screencap command. When the application window object is initialized
with the flag_ secure, the surface flinger service assigns a security flag to the frame buffer
of the associated foreground application. Then when the Screencap function requests the
frame buffer of the foreground application to perform the screenshot function, the surface
flinger service replies with an empty frame buffer. We developed a tool to run more than
130 mobile banking applications in the Nexus 10 device. This tool executes the Screencap
command as each application starts, in order to check if these apps are using the security
flag. After running this tool, we discovered that only 10 mobile banking apps use the
security flag. Table 2.8 shows these mobile banking applications. During our test of the
Table 2.8 Mobile Bank Application that use Flag_Secure
Mobile Banking Applications Names
U.S Bank Prepaid Campus Card
ABN AMRO Mobile Banking
Natioanl Bank App
First Niagara Mobile Bank
Meine Bank
Bank Millennium
Capitec Remote Bank
Easy banking BNP Paribas Fortis
ING Smart Bank
VR-Banking
Sceencap command with 130 mobile banking apps, we found two mobile banking apps,
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Woori Global Bank (132) and HANA Bank (82) prevent the user from using the application
if the smart device is rooted. This prevention limits the smart device user’s ability to use the
mobile banking apps, but does not protect the mobile banking application from screenshot
attacks.
• Protection against the fb0 method: The frame buffer device (fb0) is only accessible to
the processes that have the graphic group’s privileges or have the super user’s permission,
see section2.1.1. On the Android platform the super user consists of two components: 1)
the SU binary (119) which runs as a daemon service and broadcasts an intent message
when any process requests the super user’s permission; and 2) the Super User application
(18) which works as a control manager to receive the intent messages from the SU daemon
service. The Super User application will ask the user through prompt dialog to grant or
deny the super user permission request. A possible security weakness in the super user’s
permission usage is that when a process grants the super user permission, there is no control
over its further execution. We modified the super user components to limit the execution
of the third party applications that grant the super user permission. When the user runs the
mobile banking application, the proposed SU daemon service will deny any requests for
the super user permission from any third party applications until the banking application
process is terminated. Furthermore, any third party application that has granted the super
user permission will be terminated when the banking application starts. Since the process
that has granted the super user permission is able to modify the Android system files, the
user should be notified, if any process tries to modify the system files. Moreover, we
modified the super user application to run as a background service and communicate with
the SU daemon service through authenticated TCP socket connection to check if the SU
binary has been replaced or exploited. As Capture-Me relies on the super user’s permission
to gain access to the frame buffer device (dev/graphics/f0), our new proposed super user
will prevent Capture-Me from granting the super user permission while the mobile banking
application is running. Additionally, our proposed super user adds more fine grained access
control to the super user’s permission on the Android platform and could be extended to
work with other mobile apps.
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• Multi Factor Authontication: The Multi Factor Authentication MFA (124) is a security
mechanism that requires more than one form of authentication to verify the legitimate user
(74). In bank systems, the MFA is usually a combination of two authentication factors:
first, the (User ID and password) and second, something owned by the user, e.g: a physical
device or the phone number. Some financial institutions such as HSBC, support their clients
with a physical secure key generator. When the mobile banking application asks the user
to enter her second authentication factor instead of the user id and password, Capture-Me
failed to extract the user id and password. We mentioned the MFA authentication technique
because it limits Capture-Me trials to extract the user’s credentials for 1 or 2 sessions, as the
user will only enter her user id and password at the first time the mobile banking application
runs. Table 2.9 shows the five financial institutions we found that use the MFA technique
during our test of 130 mobile banking applications.
Table 2.9 Mobile Banking Application that use MFA mechanism
Mobile Banking Applications Names
HSBC Mobile Banking
BNY MELLON Private Banking
ABN AMRO Mobile Bank
Bank of Ireland Mobile Banking
First Security Bank Mobile

CHAPTER 3
SE-PERSONA : SECURE ENHANCEMENT CONTAINERS ON MOBILE
PLATFORM
Many companies and organizations are trying to adapt Bring Your Own Device BYOD model
(109) with their enterprise networks and systems to help their employees get the maximum ben-
efits of the smart device’s usage. The employees like to use their own smart devices to connect
to their company’s enterprise systems and do their work with greater flexibility and freedom.
Other companies have security concerns so they let their employees use the company smart
devices and prevent the employees from using their own smart devices. In both cases, com-
panies need a policy management system and a data isolation policy to overcome employees’
misuse of the smart devices with their enterprise systems (93). Mobile virtualization tech-
nology is one of the solutions that achieves data isolation and policy management in the two
aforementioned models. In fact, mobile virtualiztion offers a flexibility with the smart devices
usage and addresses the concerns over the personal data privacy, while delivering the security
requirements of the enterprise systems. Therefore, the employee can have her/his personal
mobile platform VM (Virtual Machine) side-by-side with the business mobile platform VM in
the same smart device. The separation of the mobile platform VMs (personal and business)
let the employee have full control of her/his private data and applications without affecting
the enterprise system requirements of controlling their data security and policies management.
Different virtualization technologies such as KVM (64), Xen (76) and LXC (65) are being
adapted with mobile platforms considering multiple factors such as the hardware specification,
the availability of software applications and the back end management systems. The limitation
of the smart device’s hardware compared with the desktop or server computer challenges virtu-
alization technologies to be adapted to mobile platforms. Fortunately, the lightweight OS-level
virtualization technologies such as LXC (65) or Cells (53) are well adapted to the Android plat-
form due to the minimum hardware requirements and the kernel sharing mechanism between
containers (virtual machines) which increases the system performance. In the OS-level virtual-
ization, the virtual machine is named as container due to the kernel sharing mechanism which
runs different operating systems of the same type simultaneously. Also in mobile virtualiza-
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tion technology, the container could be named as Persona due to the different personal usage of
different containers. The OS-level virtualization provides a virtual environment (for the Linux
kernel-like operating systems) that has its own process and network communication, instead
of creating a full-stack operating system as virtual machine. Furthermore, the kernel sharing
mechanism incurs less CPU and memory usage and network overhead which is important due
to the performance and hardware limitations in the smart device. However, a security weak-
ness due to the shared kernel mechanism in the OS-level virtualization could lead to privilege
escalation between containers. Typically any application/process that runs within a container
and succeeds in obtaining the root level privilege will have access to all other containers with
the same root level privilege. Cells Project (90) is a lightweight OS-level virtualization project
which shows an outstanding implementation and performance with the Android platform. The
virtualization architecture used by Cells allows multiples Android containers to run simultane-
ously on the same device where there is one foreground container and other containers running
in the background. We investigated the security of Cells system and experimented a privilege
escalation attack on the virtualization control components and we succeeded to escalate the root
privilege from one container to another. More details about Cells and its security weaknesses
will be explained in the security weaknesses section 3.3 as an example of OS-level virtualiza-
tion on mobile platform. The virtualization technologies were established and used on desktop
and server platforms which did not address the different behavior of the smart device. Due to
the mobility of the smart devices, the virtualization technologies on mobile platforms could
lead the user data (personal or business) to privacy escalation without running a malicious exe-
cution. For example ´´ consider a mobile accountant agent who has a smart device running her
business and personal mobile platform VM. The business mobile platform VM has an applica-
tion to record transactions and the GPS coordinate as the accountant meets with customers and
distributes money. Typically, any third party application in the personal mobile platform VM
has access to the Geo-location information will be able to record the GPS coordinates while
the accountant is doing her work. However, when the accountant agent is running the enter-
prise application in her business mobile platform VM, the Geo-location information becomes
enterprise sensitive data. Meanwhile, the enterprise policy management system could not dis-
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able the access to Geo-location information in the accountant personal mobile platform VM
because of the employee’s needs or the company’s policy management system has no control
over it`` . Another use case ´´ consider a company preventing its employees from using the smart
device microphone or camera during the working hours and locations. The company policy
management system applies these rules on the business mobile platform VM. However, in the
personal mobile platform VM which is running in the same device, any third party application
that has access to the microphone or camera can start recording audio or video track without
notifying the business mobile platform VM. Meanwhile, the company policy management sys-
tem cannot disable the microphone or camera in the personal mobile platform VM because it
has no control over it`` . From the previous use cases, our definition of the privacy escalation in
mobile virtualization is: In the smart device, a process which belongs to a VM is able to com-
municate or access data of a certain system resource while the active foreground VM restricts
its own processes from accessing or communicating with the same system resource. Many
research projects have been conducted to defeat the privilege and privacy escalation on the
Android platform such as Apex(103), FlaskDroid(60) and SE-Android(120). The SE-Android
becomes fully integrated in the Android Open Source Project AOSP(4) since Android version
4.3 Jellybean (23). SE-Android provides two levels of operating system policy integration in
the Android software stack; 1) Secure Enhancement Linux(105) policy which allows a low
level policy integration with the kernel devices and components; and 2) Middleware Manda-
tory Access Control MMAC policy (29) which allows a middle level policy integration with
the Android framework and third party applications. The operating system policy integration
in SE-Android enhances the Android platform security. However, SE-Android addresses the
privilege and privacy escalation in a single mobile platform and needs more investigation to be
adapted with the Android virtualizations technology.
3.1 Android Virtualization
In the 1960s the first virtualized computer was created by IBM (63). At that time, the main
purpose of virtualization technology was to share the system resources between different ap-
plications/processes that run simultaneously. Over the years, virtualization technology has
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evolved. Today we have server virtualization, desktop virtualization, mobile virtualization,
and more recently, embedded system virtualization. As virtualization technology developed
through these different stages, it required changes in both hardware and software computer
system architecture.
3.1.1 Virtualization Technology Classification
Virtualization technologies can be divided into two major perspectives.
a) Hardware perspective: The Hardware perspective classifies virtualization technology into
three types: 1) Full-Virtualization refers to a mechanism by which the virtual machine op-
erating system does not require any changes in its components as it is unaware of the host
virtualized environment. 2) Para-Virtualization refers to a mechanism by which the virtual
machine operating system requires changes to its hardware interface components to be able to
communicate with the hardware through the hypervisor interface. and 3) Hardware Support
Virtualization refers to a mechanism by which the CPU supports the host environment with
different modes of operations to run the processes with different level of privileges. The host
OS uses the root mode to run high privilege processes and use other modes to run the less
privileged processes.
b) Operating system perspective: The OS perspective classifies virtualization technology into
three categories; 1) Application level Virtualization refers to a mechanism by which the vir-
tualized components exist in the middle-ware layer and the control component is part of the
middle ware layer such as,the dalivk virtual machine on Android platform(71). 2) Operating
System level Virtualization refers to a mechanism by which the kernel layer is shared between
containers, however the control component is not part of the container middle-ware framework,
such as Linux Containers (65). 3) Full System Virtualization refers to a mechanism by which
the virtual machine OS is running without sharing any part of its software stack as for exam-
ple Xen Hypo-Visor (76) and KVM (64). Figure 3.1 shows the three types of virtualization
technology from the operating system perspective.
51
Figure 3.1 Different Types of Virtualization Technology
3.1.2 Business usages of Android Virtualization
Data isolation and secure communication are the main purposes of Android virtualization tech-
nology. As security is the main requirement of enterprise systems, we identify the most com-
mon usage of Android virualization with enterprise systems as following:
a. Service and Application isolation (14): In the smart device, enterprise applications and
services are placed in a sandbox environment where the back end enterprise system is
able to wipe or maintain damage of the enterprise application’s data in case the sandbox
environment is compromised. The sandbox environment can provide secure communica-
tion with the enterprise system. However, it does not provide data isolation. The sandbox
environment manages the application data after it becomes compromised to restrict the
data damages, but does not prevent the data damage. Another weakness in the sandbox
environment is that the enterprise system does not have the ability to apply a restricted
policy on the smart device. This in turn, can lead to privacy and privilege escalation with
the enterprise application’s data.
b. Two isolated containers (113): two rigid separated environments (business and personal)
run simultaneously in the same physical smart device in order to cover the enterprise
system security requirements. In the smart device, the enterprise applications and services
run in the isolated business container environment with the ability to be remotely managed
by the enterprise system. Moreover, the enterprise system is able to apply a restricted
policy on the smart device during the working hours and locations, and has full control
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over the smart device. The main disadvantage of the two-container environments is that
the user loses full control over her/his private data as the enterprise system can manage
the personal container environment. In fact from the users’ perspective, her/his private
data may be compromised by the enterprise system which will restrict the users’ personal
usage of the smart device.
c. Multi-OS experiences (106): the user has the ability to run multiple Android platform
simultaneously on the same smart device depending on the used virtualization technol-
ogy. The OS-level virtualization restricts the system to share a common kernel between
the Android containers. However, it can let the user run a number of different OS with
a constraint of same kernel compatibility. The user can create her/his business Android
container and give the enterprise system full control over it. The enterprise system has
the ability to manage the enterprise applications in the business container and apply a re-
stricted policy over the smart device while the business container is in the foreground and
actively used by the user. In the meantime, the user has full control over her/his personal
container without affecting the enterprise system security requirements. Moreover, since
there are many new mobile operating systems on the rise based on Linux kernel such as
Android, Ubunut touch OS (32), Firefox OS (26) and Tizen (22), this may be useful for
the enterprise system to use its secure platform on the smart device and also useful to
many experienced users.
3.1.3 Cells as OS-level Virtualization
Cells is an OS-level virtualization that shares a single kernel across all containers with vir-
tualized identifiers, kernel interfaces, and hardware resources. Figure 3.1-b typically shows
the cells’ architecture. Cells uses different namespace’s isolation mechanisms applied on the
kernel devices with hardware resource multiplexing to provide process isolation with native
performance. In more technical details, Cells uses the Mount namespace, Net namespace and
UTS namespace (92). These namespace’s isolation mechanisms required a device wrapper in-
terface for the kernel drivers, as well as modification to the kernel device subsystems in order
to manage the namespace ID. Cells assumes that the root namespace is part of the trusted com-
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puting base and it is not accessible by the containers. The Cells system starts by booting up
the root namespace, then initializes the Celld process and the minimum required components.
When the system creates a new container, the Celld process mounts the file system then clones
itself with a new namespace ID and starts the init process to boot up the new container. Celld
process is also responsible for managing (start, stop, switch and destroy) the containers. Celld
communicates with the containers by using the Inter Process Communication (IPC) mecha-
nism. The base file system in Cells is shared as a read-only file system between containers.
The file system unioning mechanism (133) is used to provide the container with a union view
of its own read-write file system and the read-only base file system. This technique provides
good scalability in creating and managing the containers. However, this mechanism increases
the likelyhood of root privilege escalation from a container to another or to the root namesepace
as the base file system is shared. We will show in section 3.3 the privilege escalation attack we
applied on Cells. Cells relies on two techniques to manage memory usage and performance; 1)
the Android low memory killer (8) which is used to increase the number of containers that are
possible to run without sacrificing system functionality; and 2) the Linux Kernel Same page
Merging KSM (72) which is used to find the anonymous memory pages that have the same
content in order to arrange them as a one copy, shared among containers. The KSM technique
improves the system memory usage. However, the author of (125) used a memory disclosure
attack to expose the shared memory data from different VMs. The memory disclosure attack
takes the advantage of the difference in write access times on the deduplicated memory pages
that are re-created by the Copy-On-Write mechanism in KSM. We will show in section 3.4 the
SE-Policy module Celld.te we created to enhance the security of the Celld component in Cells.
3.2 Security Requirements
The enterprise systems security requirements was showed in (73),(110). In the following, we
will list the security requirements of the enterprise system regards to mobile virtualization
technology.
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a. Isolation between Containers/VMs and Management module: Initially the separation
of the software stack of the running containers/VMs either sharing the kernel between
container as OS-level virtualization or running a complete OS as the hypovisor virtualiza-
tion both provide data isolation. Furthermore, file system encryption capabilities offers
more security to the local stored data. However, the virtualized environment manage-
ment module has a possible security risk to be compromised from one of the running
containers/VMs especially in the OS-level virtualization. Exposing the virtualized envi-
ronment management module could lead to privilege escalation between containers/VMs.
We will show in section 3.3 by attacking the virtualized environment management module
in Cells, we were able to control the system.
b. Policy enforcement and Context Awareness: The running foreground container/VM in
the smart device should has the ability to apply a restricted policy on its own running
applications and processes. Meanwhile, as the foreground container/VM is not aware of
other running containers/VMs, it should has the ability to apply a high level restricted
policy on the smart device resources such as camera and microphone based on time or
location constraints.
c. Secure Remote Management: The user needs to manage her/his virtualized environ-
ment in the smart device (create, start, stop and destroy containers/VMs). There are two
possible techniques to manage the virtualized environment depend on the virtualized plat-
form architecture; 1) Local management where the virtualized environment management
module exist in one of the running containers/VMs. The container that hosts the vir-
tualized environment management module works as a master container and it is part of
the trusted computing based TCB architecture and cannot be destroyed, 2) Remote man-
agement where the virtualized environment management module can be accessible by an
authenticated network connection or through connected desktop PC (USB/Serial connec-
tion). The virtualized environment management module is part of the trusted computing
based TCB architecture and it starts early in the system’s components boot up sequence.
Many virtualization technologies support libvirt (83) virtualization API for remote man-
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agement functionality. Both techniques should be implemented in mobile virtualization
technologies according to usability and security requirements. Possible security risks at
compromising the master container for local management and at connecting the smart
device to a desktop PC for remote management.
3.3 Attacks Models
The virtualization technologies on the server platform rely on the isolation between contain-
ers/virtual machines to achieve data isolation, and use other security management systems to
protect the server platform such as firewall and anti-virus. Users or applications gain access to
the server platform after going through different authentication mechanisms and system poli-
cies to protect the server platform from malicious executions and misuse. However, the smart
device usage is different. The smart device user has the ability to easily install/uninstall appli-
cations which lead to misuse her/his private data. The software architecture of Cells (OS-level
virtualization ) shows security weaknesses in different levels of the system software-stack. As
for example; if a process that belongs to a running container succeeds to obtain the root names-
pace’s privilege, it will be able to control other containers. Also Cells does not provide access
control policies or secure remote management to the virtualized environment. We will inves-
tigate the possible security weaknesses in Cells by applying three attacks models; privilege
escalation, privacy escalation and remote management attack.
3.3.1 Privacy Escalation attack
As the running foreground container is unaware of the background running containers in the
same smart device, the privacy escalation attack model is defined as follow: A process P which
belongs to a compromised container C´running in background, will be able to communicate or
access data of a system resource R which is under restricted access policy in the foreground
container C´´ where C´and C´´ belong to Cs; the set of containers in the smart device. The
attack environment consists of two containers C1 and C2. We assume that accessing the GPS
coordinate data and audio recorder functionality by the third party applications are restricted in
C1. We installed a GPS tracker application and audio recorder application from Google Play
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store in C2. The attack model starts by placing the container C2 in the foreground and then
the user starts the GPS tracker app and the audio recorder app. The user starts the container
C1 and switches it to the foreground then uses the smart device as she/he will move around
and talk to people. After the user ends the work with the container C1, she/he switchs back the
container C2 to the foreground. The GPS tracker app was able to access the GPS coordinate
and the audio recorder app was able to record an audio track while she/he was actively using
the container C1. We propose new properties to the MMAC policy to apply more fine grained
access control on Android platform system permission to overcome the privacy escalation. We
will explain in more details the MMAC policy in section 3.4.1.
3.3.2 Privilege Escalation attack
According to Cells architecture (see section 3.1.3), the privilege escalation attack model is used
to obtain the root namespace privilege defined as follow: A running process P belonging to a
container C is able to obtain the root namespace privilege which is not originally granted to it.
We apply this attack model on Cells open source project (90) built on top of Android 4.3 Jelly
Beans platform (23). Since Android 4.3 platform released the secure enhancement Linux kernel
module (77) was implemented on Android platform. However, when we checked the SE-Linux
module status in Cells, we found that the SE-Linux is disabled. As Cells provides a modified
Kernel configuration (12) which disables the security option of the SE-Linux module in the
kernel, we modified the Kernel configuration to enable the SE-Linux security option. Also, we
integrated the system with the SE-Policy of Android 4.4 KitKat platform (37) which applies the
enforcing mode in the SE-policy and has more stability. As we explained in section 3.1.3 celld
process is the control component of the virtualized containers, for this reason we tried to obtain
access to the celld process to be able to control other containers. In the root namespace, the
communication with the celld process is performed by using the command-line cell. By using
the command-line cell the legitimate user is able to create, destroy, start, stop, and configure
containers. We initialized the attack environment by starting three different containers C1,
C2 and C3. We develop an application to check the ability of executing the command-line
cell from one of the running containers. The application is installed on C1 and by executing
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the application, we where able to create a new container C4 and stop, start, destroy other
containers. Furthermore, as celld has the ability to execute a shell command in the running
containers, we were able to obtain a shell access to other containers from C1. We explained
the success of the privilege escalation attack we applied, by the fact that the Cells’ components
were not defined nor implemented in the SE-Policy modules. We will show in section 3.4
our proposed SE-Policy module for celld process which is mandatory to defeat the privilege
escalation from the running containers to the root namespace.
3.3.3 Remote management Attack
In Cells, the legitimate user should connect the smart device to a desktop PC through USB
connection and use the ADB (Android Debug Bridge) (3) command to gain access to the root
namespace shell. After the user gains access to the root namespace shell, she/he will be able
to manage the virtualized environment (Containers/Persona) by using the cell command. The
attack we applied takes advantage of connecting the smart device to a desktop PC to manage
the virtualized environment and injects a malware to one of the running containers. In more
technical details, Cells stores the containers directories under the data partition in the smart
device. Each container has its read-only file system which is the base file system (see section
3.1.3) and also has its own read-write file system which exists under the /data/cells/ directory
in the data partition. As the ADB connects to Cells through the root namespace, the ADB gains
the root namespace privilege over the data partition which gives it the ability to copy a file from
the connected desktop PC to the smart device’s data partition then executes it. We designed a
simple malware to run as a native service and read the content of any text file in the container
external storage then send the file content to the attacker server. The attack scenario is defined
as follow: 1) The smart device user connect the smart device to his desktop PC to manage the
running persona/container or to transfer some files. 2) The user’s Desktop PC was infected
by captivating application which will copy and execute the malware (native service) to the
smart device once the user connect the smart device to the desktop PC. 3) The native service
will scan the container’s external storage and read the text files’ content than send the file’s
content to the attacker server. We suggest an ADB proxy component to the Cells architecture
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to defeat the remote management attack. The smart device’s user should not be able to copy
and execute files by using the ADB commands under the root namespace privilege. However,
the smart device’s user should be able to use the ADB commands with the running containers
as a normal Android platform. In some cases, the user may need to use the ADB connection
for application development activity. More details will be explain in section 3.4.3.
3.4 Mitigating OS-level Virtualization by SE-Android
Security Enhanced Linux (SE-Linux)(105) was originally developed as a Mandatory Access
Control (MAC) (78) mechanism for Linux OS. Android platform built on the top of Linux
kernel and thus the SE-Linux was capable to be implemented with Android platform. The
author of SE-Android explained the required changes of the Android security architecture and
components to integrate the MAC mechanism with the Android platform (120). In this section,
we will explain our contribution based on the SE-Policy and Android platform to mitigate the
attack scenarios we applied on Cells. We proposed a new SE-Policy module celld.te which
secure the celld process against the privilege escalation attack. Also we proposed new proper-
ties to the MMAC policy to overcome the privacy escalation between containers. Finally, we
proposed a new ADB proxy component to mitigate the possible security threat against the root
namespace.
3.4.1 MMAC Policy on Android Virtualization
In Android platform, applications should be digitally signed by a X.509 certificate to be in-
stalled on the system. The signing certificate allows the Android platform to provide signature-
based permissions enforcement between applications that use the same certificate. Applica-
tions with the same signing certificate can share applications’ modules, data and files. The
SE-Android MMAC policy is built on top of Android platform’s middle-ware framework se-
curity architecture. The MMAC policy controls the application’s access (grant/deny the uses-
permission) to the system resources even after the system resource was granted to the applica-
tion during the installation process. The MMAC policy categorizes the installed applications
depending on the application signing certificates. In Android open source project AOSP (4),
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the system applications are placed under the AOSP signed categories and the third party ap-
plications are placed under the default category. The Android platform vendors can insert a
new applications category to the MMAC policy by using the Insert-Key tool (112) and they
can control the third party applications’ uses-permission. The MMAC policy source file is
mac_permission.xml which is written in XML format with predefined tags (80) (28). Table 3.1
describes the available XML tags in the MMAC policy.
Table 3.1 MMAC Policy Tags
MMAC Policy Tags and Description
<signer signature="" >
Signer tag required a signature with a hex encoded X.509 certificate, Ex:<signer
signature="PLATFORM" >The platform is tag referred by Keys.conf file [58]
<seinfo value="" >
Seinfo tag represents additional info that each app can use in setting a SE-Android
security context on the eventual process, Ex: <seinfo value="platform">
<package name="" >
Package tag defines allow and deny android system permission for a certain package
name protected by the signature Ex: <package name="com.source.test">
<allow-permission name="" >
Allow-permission tag define the allowed Android system permission for a certain
applications category or application package Ex: <allow-permission name
="android.permission.INTERNET" >
<deny-permission name="" >
Deny-permission tag defines the denied Android system permission for a certain
applications category or application package Ex: <deny-permission name
="android.permission.WAKE_LOCK" >
<default >
Default tag is used to define the default policy that will be applied on the third party
applications.
<allow-all >
Allow-all tag is used to allows any Android system permission requested by the
applications under certain category.
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3.4.1.1 Context Awareness
The applications categorization in the MMAC policy provides flexibility to manage the system
uses-permissions with different applications instead of defining a policy for each application.
However, it is missing the context awarenesses. The security requirements for different stake-
holders depend on the smart device’s usage times and locations. As we explained in the intro-
duction section, the security policy of an enterprise system might dictate that certain assets in
the smart device such as microphone, should be restricted during the working hours or while
the device is connected to the enterprise network. According to the current MMAC policy
properties, the policy Access Control AC decision will be taken as black/white list concept.
The smart device user will not be able to change the application state from the white list (al-
low uses-permission) to the black list (deny uses-permission) until she/he reload the MMAC
Policy (mac-permission.xml) into the Android platform. Moreover, in the virtualized envi-
ronment, the running foreground container is unaware of the running background containers’
MMAC policies which could easily lead to data privacy escalation between containers. To en-
able the context awarenesses access control decision, we propose new properties Exclusive-use,
Exclusive-deny, Trusted-app and Security-level to the MMAC policy;
a. Exclusive-use: The application has declared the required uses-permission to gain access to
a certain system resource. Meanwhile, at the application’s execution time, the application
should be the only process that has access to the required system resource.
b. Exclusive-deny: At the application’s execution time, the application might needs to re-
strict the accessibility of a certain system resource due to security concern. However, the
application is not required access to the same system resource to work properly.
c. Trusted-app: The MMAC policy should specify which application or applications’ cate-
gory will has the ability to apply the Exclusive-use and Exclusive-deny policy. Otherwise
any third party application can interrupt the system resources.
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d. Security-level: As the MMAC policy could have multiple categories or applications with
Trusted-app property, the Security-level prioritize the different trusted-app categories and
applications. Otherwise the MMAC policy rules might cause conflicts in the AC decision.
e. Restricted-Permission: According to the different business usage of the enterprise sys-
tems, the enterprise system should has the ability to restrict the access to a certain system
resource such as microphone or camera during certain times or locations. The enterprise
system will be able to specify the times by an interval time period and will be able to
specify the geographic locations by a GPS coordinates and buffer length. Restricted-
Permission will be applied on all running containers (background and foreground) on the
smart device and it has the highest security level.
f. Restricted-Applications: In Android platform AOSP the Play Store and GMAIL applica-
tions runs as system applications. To restrict the company’s employees from use the Play
store application and install third party applications in the business container. The Play
store application package name will be defined under the Restricted-Applications tag to
restrict the employee from use the play store inside the business container.
The business workflow and security concerns of the mobile enterprise application change due
to different reasons. These changes could require also changes to the MMAC policy which
will overwhelm the smart device’s user as she/he will need to flush the smart device with a
new Android ROM (24). Since both usability and security are concerns to the smart device’s
user and enterprise systems, the Exclusive-use and Exclusive-deny policy’s properties will be
defined by the mobile application in its package file. The mobile enterprise application should
declare in its Manifest file the Exclusive-use permissions and the Exclusive-deny permissions
and the Trusted-app property should be declared under the enterprise application’s category
in the MMAC policy. By this technique we met the mobile enterprise application security
requirements with the usability concern of the smart device’s user. As the MMAC policy and
the Manifest file are written in XML formate, we defined the new policy’s proprieties as XML
Tags. Tables 3.2 shows the new policy’s properties tags and description.
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Table 3.2 The new MMAC Policy Properties tags definition
The Properties’ Tags and Description
<Exclusive-use-permission android:name="" >
We used the same Android uses-permission names to specify which system resource is
required for the exclusive use. e.g:<Exclusive-use-permission
android:name="android.permission.ACCESS_ FINE_ LOCATION" />
<Exclusive-deny-permission android:name="" >
We used the same Android uses-permission names to specify which system resource is
required for the exclusive deny. e.g:<Exclusive-deny-permission
android:name="android.permission.RECORD_ AUDIO" >
<Trusted-app value="" >
The Trusted-app properties value could be 1 or 0 (1 = trusted, 0 = untrusted ) and by
default it is 0. Also it should be defined after the signer or package tag. e.g: <signer
signature="" > <Trusted-app value="1" ></signer>
<Security-level value="" >
The Security-level value depend on the policy creator prioritization and it should defined
after the Trusted-app tag. e.g: <Trusted-app value="1" ><Security-level value="1" >
<Restricted-Permission x="" y="" len="" start-time="" end-time="">
</Restricted-Permission>
The Restricted-Permission could be defined under the signer tag to be applied on certain
applications’ category or could be defined without a signer tag to be applied on the smart
device. The restricted permission should be listed within the Restricted-permission tag.
e.g: <Restricted-Permission x="79.223" y="23.88" len="1000" start-time="9:00:00"
end-time="14:00:00"><uses-permission
android:name="android.permission.ACCESS_ FINE_ LOCATION"/
></Restricted-Permission>
<Restricted-Application >
The Restricted-Application will be define to restrict the uses of some system applications
such as the Play store application in some containers. The application’s package name
should be defined under the Restricted-Application tag. e.g:
<Restricted-Application><package name="com.android.vending"/
></Restricted-Application>
3.4.1.2 The MMAC policy Rules Conflicts
In the Android virtualization environments such as Cells, Containers are sharing the same
MMAC policy. However, the running foreground container is unaware of other running con-
tainers’ applications and processes. The policy AC decision conflict will happen in two use-
cases; a) When two applications running in the same container are declared in the MMAC pol-
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icy under two different categories and both of them required Exclusive-use-permission for the
same system resource. In this case the policy AC decision should be taken by the smart device’s
user to choose which application should gain access to the system resource or by prioritizing
the applications’ categories using security levels. b) When two applications are declared in the
MMAC policy under two different categories and they are running in two different containers.
Both of them required Exclusive-use-permission for the same system resource. In this case
the system will rely on the foreground container to take the policy AC decision. We solve the
policy AC decision conflict by taking the AC decision in two steps; 1) Inside the container as
each container responsible for its policy AC decision; and 2) Inside the root namespace as the
root namespace is the only module aware of all running containers’ application and processes.
The policy AC decision inside the container formulated as following:
• AC (A, R, A ∈ Ta, Ta ∈ Sl) → 1/0
The AC is the access control decision function will grant the application (A) which is the first
input parameter to access the system resource (R) which is the second input parameter if: A
∈ Ta where Ta is a set of the Trusted-app in the MMAC policy. Ta ∈ Sl where Sl is a set of
the highest Security-level category in the container’s MMAC policy. The policy AC decision
inside the root namespace formulated as following:
• AC (A, R, A ∈ Ta, A ∈ Fc, Ta ∈ Sl) → 1/0
The AC is the access control decision function will grant the application (A) which is the first
input parameter to access the system resource (R) which is the second input parameter if: A
∈ Ta where Ta is a set of the Trusted-app in the MMAC policy. A ∈ Fc where Fc is a set of
the running applications in the foreground container. Ta ∈ Sl where Sl is a set of the highest
Security-level category in the foreground container’s MMAC policy.
3.4.2 SE-Policy in Android
The SE-Policy (30) contains the definitions of the security object classes and their associated
permissions and rules that are used by the Linux Security Modules (LSM)(134) to apply the
MAC in Android security architecture. The objective of SE-Policy is to classify the system
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resources such as files, sockets, etc and define their related permissions that represent accesses
to those resources such as reading or sending operations (81). SE-Policy consist of source files
(file.te) which are used to generate the kernel binary policy file. In the following we will give
a brief description of the major SE-Policy source files on Android platform.
a. security_classes (49): The security classes source file contains the definition of the system
resource objects such as file, socket, binder, etc.
b. access_vectors (34): The access vectors source file contains the definition of the system
resources permissions. For example the access vector of the file object as a security class
is (ioctl, read, write, create, etc).
c. attributes (41): The attributes source file contains the declaration of policy object at-
tributes and types. We can consider attributes as a property of policy types, usually used
as a group of types e.g; domain, exec_type, port_type, etc.
d. domain.te (42): The domain source file contains the declarations of rules assigned to all
domains e.g. allow domain fs:file { read getattr }.
e. file.te (43): The file.te source file contains the definition of all android system types e.g.
file_type, bluetooth_type, adb_socket, etc.
f. file_context (44): The file context source file contains directories and files labels configu-
ration which used by the Android platform to set the read, write and execute permissions
of the files and directories.
g. property_contexts (47): The property context source file contains the configurations of
the Android platform services properties which used to specify the security context of
Android daemon service during the permission checking operation.
h. seapp_contexts (48): The seapp context source file contains the labels configurations that
used to label different applications processes and package directories.
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i. mls (46): The mls source file contains the declaration of the multi level security constrains
that used to isolate application processes and files such as mlsconstrain process { transition
dyntransition } ((h1 eq h2 and l1 eq l2) or t1 == mlstrustedsubject).
The SE-Policy is designed to be extended and to cover the security requirements of different
Linux like operating systems. The procedures of extending the Android platform SE-Policy
are explained at (20) and (19). To achieve a secure OS-level virtualization on Android Plat-
form, we must first define a set of subjects and objects which are essential for the system to
work properly. We followed the SE-Policy customization procedure to create the celld policy
module.
3.4.2.1 Celld policy module
We added the celld.te source file to the SE-Policy modules which contain the definition of the
Celld security object class and its associated type, rules and permissions. We define the celld
type as domain type and we assigned to it the allow rules to control the cgroups and mount
operation. Also we define the celld process as a security class in security_class source file and
define the label configurations of celld and cell binaries in the file_context.te source file. The
Celld process should have the privilege to mount the system partitions, starts the init process
and control cgroups in the kernel systems. Figure3.2 shows a part of the celld.te policy source
file.
3.4.3 ADB Proxy for Mobile virtualization technology
In this section we propose an ADB proxy component to virtualize the ADB component on An-
droid platform and restrict the ADB access to the root namespace in Cells. The ADB in both
sides the Desktop PC and the Android smart device acts as a transparent transport mechanism
(136). Its two most important components are 1) the adb server which is running on the host
(Desktop PC) and 2) the adbd daemon which is running on the target (Android smart device).
These two components effectively implement a proxy protocol on which all adb services are
implemented and they linked together either through USB or TCP/IP connection (3). We mod-
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Figure 3.2 Celld SE-Policy Module
ified the adbd daemon (the target device) to virtualize and restrict the adb command executed
from the adb server (the host device). When the ADB connection is established between the
smart device and a desktop PC, adbd daemon service will request from celld daemon service
the current running foreground container’s name and developer options accessibility. The smart
device’s user will be able to use all the adb commands and functionality (10) with the running
foreground container as a normal android platform. All other running background containers
are not accessible by the adb commands as the ADB is not aware of them. The smart device’s
user is able to gain access to the root namespace by the "adb shell -root" command and all other
adb commands are restricted on the root namespace.
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3.5 Architecture and Design
In Android 4.3 JB version, there are about 50-70 system services which give the mobile appli-
cations capabilities to communicate with the system resources through callable interfaces (25).
The Android platform provides Binder IPC mechanism (7) to allow communication between
applications and system services. There are 150 built in permissions on Android platform to
constrain the application accesses to the system resources (5). We classify the system resources
into two types; 1) The simulated resources by which the resource could be simulate its state
and data. For example, the location manager service that represents the geographic coordinates
could be simulated to gives simulated coordinate (x=0,y=0). and 2) The unsimulated resources
such as the bluetooth and network. Based on this classification we control the running third
party applications and processes access to the system resources during the MMAC policy en-
forcement. The idea behind this classification is to prevent the application’s segmentation fault
or crashing while applying the MMAC policy enforcement. The applications that require ac-
cess to a simulated system resource will receive a simulated data and those applications that
require access to unsimulated system resources will receive denied access signal or will be
terminated if they were actively running before the MMAC policy enforcement decision. We
implement the SE-Persona prototype based on the Cells open source project (90) which is built
on top of the Android 4.3 JB version. The default mac_permissions.xml file which contain the
MMAC policy definition exist in the Android open source project AOSP under external/sepol-
icy/mac_permissions.xml in the source tree and as /system/etc/security/mac_permissions.xml
on the device. As Cells uses the same Android framework version between containers and
use the unioning file system mechanism (see background section) we exclude the mac_permis-
sion.xml from the read-only file system (base FS) and include it in the read-write file system in
order to let each container has its own MMAC policy. Initially every new container will have
the default MMAC policy as it exist in the AOSP (28) then the container will be able to reload
its own MMAC policy. We modified different components in the Android framework to meet
the new requirements of the MMAC policy. We proposed and implement new component to
the Android framework which is the Permission Controller Manager PCM and we developed
its virtualized component to Cells architecture which is the Root Permission Controller Man-
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ager RootPCM. PCM and RootPCM will be responsible for enforcing the new MMAC policy
requirements. In the following we will explain the modified Android framework component,
PCM and RPCM. Figure 3.3 shows the new security architecture we propose for the Android
platform and Cells.
Figure 3.3 Architecture of SE-Persona security model
3.5.1 PackageParser
(107) The package parser module verify and extract the information of the mobile application
executable file (app.apk file) at the beginning of the installation process. As we added new tags
to the application Manifest file (Exclusive-use and Exclusive-deny permission), we modified
the package parser to be able to extract these information..
3.5.2 PackageManager
(38) The package manager service is responsible for installing and uninstalling applications on
the Android platform. Also it manages the installed applications meta informations such as the
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package name and its related UID, the installation directories, the required permissions and the
application certificate signature. All these meta information is stored in the packages.xml file
under /data/system/ directory. We modified the package manager to include the Exclusive-use
and Exclusive-deny permission tags that exist in the application’s Manifest file and during the
installation process checks for the application’s related category in the MMAC policy.
3.5.3 SELinuxMMAC
(21) The SELinuxMMAC module is responsible for reading, parsing and validating the MMAC
policy. We extend the SELinuxMMAC to consider the new MMAC policy properties we have
proposed and store the new policy tags with its relative application’s package information.
3.5.4 PermissionControllerManager PCM
PCM is the heart of SE-Persona implementation, PCM will start early at the container ini-
tialization. PCM will load the MMAC policy and initialize a list of the Exclusive-use/deny
permissions that required by the MMAC policy. Each permission in the permission list has
a status active/inactive. When the Activity Manager (35) starts an application, the PCM will
check the application’s category, related permissions (Exclusive-use/deny), uses-permission
and Security-Level. When untrusted application starts and its uses-permission match one of
the Exclusive-use/deny permissions that required by the MMAC policy, the PCM will add the
application to the tracked applications list. When a trusted application starts, the PCM will add
the application to the active application list then check its corresponding Exclusive-use/deny
permissions and update the related permissions status to the active status. The PCM will send
an intent to the corresponding system service (such as location-manager) to simulate its data
and for the unsimulated system service (such as microphone) the PCM will send intent to the
package-manager to deny its uses-permission if requested during the trusted application ex-
ecution time. In our prototype, we only make modification to the location-manager service
to simulate its data. Also the PCM has a global setting for the Geo-location and day time in
order to apply the high level restricted policy such as Restricted-Permission and Restricted-
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Application. Figure 3.4 shows the Architecture of the added components in android security
model.
Figure 3.4 Architecture of the Security Model Inside Single SE-Persona
3.5.5 RootPermissionControllerManager RootPCM
The RootPCM runs in the root namespace on Cells platform. When a new container starts, the
RootPCM will register its PCM component at the running container list in order to notify the
PCM about other containers’ policy requirements. When an Exclusive-use/deny permission
has an active status inside a container, the RootPCM will notify the others containers PCM
component through a binder interface (116) to add the Exclusive-use/deny permission to its
permission list (if not exist) and change the permission status to active. The RootPCM and
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PCMs will communicate according to the Exclusive-use/deny permission status change. Figure
3.3 shows the new security architecture we propose for the Android platform and Cells.
3.6 Evaluation
In this section, we present measurements regards to the SE-Persona platform performance and
we examine the SE-Persona security against privilege escalation and private data exposer.
3.6.1 Performance
We evaluate the performance of SE-Persona prototype by comparing the original Cells plat-
form performance with SE-Persona prototype performance using four benchmarks AnTuTu
Benchmark, Geekbench 3, Vellamo Mobile Benchmark and Quadrant Standard Edition. The
benchmarks environment consist of three running containers and the used device is Nexus
7 version 2012 (1.3GHz quad-core Tegra 3 processor, 1GB of RAM, 12-core GPU, 16GB
flash memory). These benchmarks are designed to test different aspect of the device func-
tionality and resources such as 2D and 3D graphics performance, Disk I/O, Memory I/O and
CPU performance. The scores explain how well the device is running after the modification
that SE-Persona added to Cells. We run these benchmarks five times in each container and
we normalize the results values to the manufacturer’s unmodified Android OS which has the
benchmarks score value 10. Figure 3.5 shows the result of the benchmarks that ran in both
SE-Persona prototype and original Cells.
3.6.2 Evaluation
SE-Persona implementation is based on Cells which use namespace isolation mechanisms and
cgroup (control group) to provide isolation and secure environment. In order to evaluate the
SE-Persona platform security we applied different attacks in order to gain higher privilege and
expose privacy.
privilege escalation: As we mentioned in the Adversary model sec3.3, the control-host (celld
process) is the attacker target in order to control the virtualization environment. Based on the
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Figure 3.5 Benchmarks score result of three running containers
root user privilege (91) We were able to execute the cell command from one of the running
container which let us create, start, stop and destroy containers from one of the running con-
tainer. We explained the attack success by the fact that Cells’ components (celld process and
cell command) were not defined nor implemented in the SE-Policy modules. SE-Persona has
defined and implement the SE-Policy module for the celld process (see section3.4.2) in order
to prevent the privilege escalation to the control-host. We applied the root user privilege attack
on SE-Persona to expose the celld process. However, the attack failed and the celld process
only accessible through the root namespace.
privacy escalation: By integrating the context awarenesses MMAC policy in SE-Persona, the
third party apps were not able to access the system resources such as location manager or audio
service while the Exclusive-use or Exclusive-deny permission is applied in one of the running
containers. Moreover, the Security-level in MMAC policy applied more fine grained access
control on the application’s execution. As for example, it was shown in (135)(61) using the
accelerometer sensor could lead to expose the user typing data (could be user-name/password).
SE-Persona can define the mobile banking applications under a higher security level rather than
normal third party applications and prevent access to accelerometer sensor while the banking
application is running. The Restricted-Permission added more usability and scalability to the
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Android platform uses-permission. The user able to grant/deny a certain permissions depend
on her/his location and times without required the application to define its Exclusive-use or
Exclusive-deny permission. The Restricted-Application added more scalability to the contain-
ers. As for example, in Android platform AOSP the Gmail, Play Store and YouTube appli-
cations runs as system applications. While the smart device’s user create a new container for
her/his kids for child entertainment activity. The kids could miss use the Play Store applica-
tion by installing undesirable applications or use the Youtube to watch undesirable videos. By
using the Restricted-Application the smart device user can prevent access to these applications
in her/his kids container platform.
Limitation: SE-Persona implementation goal is make a minimum modification to the original
Cells and Android platform. That was satisfied by using the on/off technique to control the
system permission depend on the device context. However, this technique limits the context
awareness policy to be extendable nor self-defined. As for example, SE-Persona can not define
the device context depend on the application execution behavior. SE-Persona can not recognize
the device context depend on application type (e.g: background service app, chat app, media
player app). Also SE-Persona classify the applications depend on its certificate only which
is mismatch with any other classification such as the applications’ categories in Google Play
store. Overall SE-Persona context awareness policy can satisfy the enterprise systems usage.
However, it needs massive changes on the OS-level virtualization architecture and Android
platform to be more flexible and extendable.

CONCLUSION
In this work we studied the smart device usage with the enterprise solutions. We proposed a se-
curity driven taxonomy for enterprise mobile applications, then we defined the security require-
ments that required by the enterprise solution to manage the security risks of the smart devices.
We surveyed the current proposed solutions ideas from academia and presented KNOX as an
industry solution from Samsung. Also we investigated the security risks of the password vis-
ibility feature on the Android platform. We presented Capture-Me as a new screenshot attack
to expose the user credentials from the mobile banking applications. We evaluated Capture-
Me in a practical attack scenario with six mobile banking applications and PayPal’s mobile
application. We explored the possible protection mechanisms to defeat the screenshot attacks
on the Android platform with more than 130 mobile banking applications. We discovered that
most of the mobile banking applications we examined do not use any protection mechanism
to defeat the screenshot attacks. The experimental results of the Capture-Me attacks show the
weakness of the (user id and password) as the only authentication mechanism used in many mo-
bile banking applications. Our recommendation is that the mobile banking application should
implement other authentication techniques such as the multi factor authentication in order to
protect their users’ data and their system’s integrity. Finally, we investigate the security weak-
ness of the virualization technology with smart devices (phones and tables), we were able to
apply different attack models on Cells as an example of the OS-level virtualization architecture.
We proposed new properties to the MMAC policy with a modification to the Android security
architecture to apply more fine grained access control on the Android system resources. Our
recommendation is that smart devices platforms need to adapt new policies with paying atten-
tion to the user privacy and the mobility of the smart devices. Our future works will focus on
privacy exposure attacks on smart and wearable devices. The smart device’s mobility makes the
smart device screen more vulnerable to different kinds of privacy exposure attacks, especially
since the Android wearable SDK (79) became available to third party application developers.
There are many wearable devices such as the Samsung Gear watch (114) and Google glass (27)
that will be available for normal users, these devices have a good camera that can be used to
expose the user’s private data from the smart device screen as the `` iSpy´´ (108) study showed.
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In the wearable device era, The UX (user experiences) of the smart devices will need new
secure authentication techniques to protect the user’s credentials and private data.
APPENDIX I
Appendix I, shows the result tables of the Capture-Me attack experimental test. Each table
present trials of 30 passwords with the seven mobile banking applications that we considered
in the attack scenario.
78
Table-A I-1 Experimental results of the the Nexus 10 at session 1
Nexus 10 session 1
Passwords
CIBC
Bank
BMO
Bank
Natioanl
Bank
RBC
Bank
Scotia
Bank
TD
canada
Bank
PayPal
Alq012$suv 7 4 5 7 7 7 7
zSd@347ege 8 4 6 8 8 7 8
123Pa$sword 7 4 5 7 7 7 7
Ghau789@fb 7 5 5 8 8 8 7
het239$quI 8 4 6 7 7 7 8
123@Myname 7 4 6 8 8 8 8
Canda$987p 8 4 5 7 7 8 7
loL$123lol 7 3 5 7 7 7 7
Home@123jk 8 5 6 8 8 8 8
Capme@123k 8 4 5 8 7 8 8
Test$890me 6 4 5 7 7 7 8
suv345@Qsd 8 4 5 7 7 8 7
where789@d 7 3 4 8 7 7 7
my478@Test 8 5 6 8 8 8 8
Ets@123cap 7 4 5 8 7 7 7
Mount@345s 7 4 5 7 8 7 8
234$testMe 8 5 5 8 8 8 8
wHen@u234s 8 4 4 7 7 8 7
some$123He 8 4 4 8 7 7 7
How$ukn235 7 5 5 8 7 8 7
Pets$567we 6 4 5 7 7 7 7
Tttt@789un 7 3 4 7 7 6 7
Gggggg@234 7 3 4 7 7 6 7
Mmmmmm@111 6 3 4 6 6 6 6
Jjjjjj$999 6 3 4 6 6 6 6
tesest$123 7 4 5 7 7 8 7
$Pppppp234 7 3 4 6 7 7 7
Hhhhh@123h 7 3 4 6 8 7 7
Whyu@me789 8 4 5 8 8 8 8
how@Cap456 8 5 6 8 7 8 8
Average 7.2 3.9 4.9 7.3 7.2 7.3 7.3
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Table-A I-2 Experimental results of the the Nexus 10 at session 2
Nexus 10 session 2
Passwords
CIBC
Bank
BMO
Bank
Natioanl
Bank
RBC
Bank
Scotia
Bank
TD
canada
Bank
PayPal
Alq012$suv 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
zSd@347ege 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
123Pa$sword 9 6 8 9 9 9 10
Ghau789@fb 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
het239$quI 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
123@Myname 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
Canda$987p 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
loL$123lol 9 6 8 9 8 9 9
Home@123jk 9 6 8 10 10 10 10
Capme@123k 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
Test$890me 10 6 8 10 10 9 10
suv345@Qsd 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
where789@d 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
my478@Test 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
Ets@123cap 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
Mount@345s 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
234$testMe 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
wHen@u234s 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
some$123He 9 6 8 9 9 9 9
How$ukn235 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
Pets$567we 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
Tttt@789un 9 6 8 10 9 9 10
Gggggg@234 9 6 8 8 9 9 8
Mmmmmm@111 8 6 8 8 8 9 9
Jjjjjj$999 9 6 8 8 9 8 8
tesest$123 9 6 8 9 9 9 9
$Pppppp234 8 6 8 8 9 8 9
Hhhhh@123h 8 6 8 9 8 9 9
Whyu@me789 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
how@Cap456 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
Average 9.5 6 8 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.6
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Table-A I-3 Experimental results of the the Nexus 10 at session 3
Nexus 10 session 3
Passwords
CIBC
Bank
BMO
Bank
Natioanl
Bank
RBC
Bank
Scotia
Bank
TD
canada
Bank
PayPal
Alq012$suv 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
zSd@347ege 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
123Pa$sword 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
Ghau789@fb 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
het239$quI 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
123@Myname 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
Canda$987p 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
loL$123lol 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
Home@123jk 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
Capme@123k 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
Test$890me 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
suv345@Qsd 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
where789@d 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
my478@Test 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
Ets@123cap 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
Mount@345s 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
234$testMe 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
wHen@u234s 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
some$123He 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
How$ukn235 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
Pets$567we 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
Tttt@789un 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
Gggggg@234 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
Mmmmmm@111 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
Jjjjjj$999 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
tesest$123 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
$Pppppp234 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
Hhhhh@123h 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
Whyu@me789 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
how@Cap456 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
Average 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
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Table-A I-4 Experimental results of the the HTC Desire HD at session 1
HTC Desire HD session 1
Passwords
CIBC
Bank
BMO
Bank
Natioanl
Bank
RBC
Bank
Scotia
Bank
TD
canada
Bank
PayPal
Alq012$suv 6 4 4 6 7 7 7
zSd@347ege 7 3 5 7 7 7 7
123Pa$sword 7 4 4 7 7 6 7
Ghau789@fb 6 4 5 7 7 6 7
het239$quI 7 4 5 6 6 7 7
123@Myname 7 3 5 7 8 8 8
Canda$987p 8 4 5 7 7 8 7
loL$123lol 6 3 5 6 7 6 7
Home@123jk 7 4 6 8 7 7 7
Capme@123k 8 4 5 7 7 7 8
Test$890me 6 3 5 7 6 6 7
suv345@Qsd 8 4 5 7 7 7 7
where789@d 6 3 4 8 7 7 7
my478@Test 7 4 6 7 8 7 8
Ets@123cap 7 4 5 8 7 6 7
Mount@345s 7 4 4 7 8 7 8
234$testMe 8 5 5 8 8 8 8
wHen@u234s 7 4 4 7 7 8 7
some$123He 8 4 4 8 7 7 7
How$ukn235 7 4 5 8 7 8 7
Pets$567we 6 4 4 7 7 7 7
Tttt@789un 6 3 4 7 7 6 7
Gggggg@234 6 3 4 7 7 6 7
Mmmmmm@111 6 3 4 6 6 6 6
Jjjjjj$999 6 3 4 6 6 6 6
tesest$123 7 4 5 7 7 8 7
$Pppppp234 6 3 4 6 6 6 6
Hhhhh@123h 6 3 4 6 8 7 7
Whyu@me789 8 4 5 8 8 8 8
how@Cap456 8 4 5 8 7 8 8
Average 6.8 3.6 4.6 7.0 7.0 6.9 7.1
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Table-A I-5 Experimental results of the the HTC Desire HD at session 2
HTC Desire HD session 2
Passwords
CIBC
Bank
BMO
Bank
Natioanl
Bank
RBC
Bank
Scotia
Bank
TD
canada
Bank
PayPal
Alq012$suv 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
zSd@347ege 9 6 8 9 10 9 10
123Pa$sword 9 6 8 9 9 9 10
Ghau789@fb 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
het239$quI 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
123@Myname 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
Canda$987p 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
loL$123lol 9 6 8 9 8 9 9
Home@123jk 9 6 8 10 10 10 10
Capme@123k 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
Test$890me 10 6 8 10 10 9 10
suv345@Qsd 9 6 8 9 10 9 10
where789@d 9 6 8 10 10 10 10
my478@Test 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
Ets@123cap 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
Mount@345s 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
234$testMe 9 6 8 9 10 9 10
wHen@u234s 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
some$123He 9 6 8 9 9 9 9
How$ukn235 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
Pets$567we 9 6 8 10 9 9 9
Tttt@789un 9 6 8 9 9 9 9
Gggggg@234 9 5 7 8 9 9 8
Mmmmmm@111 8 5 7 8 8 9 9
Jjjjjj$999 9 6 8 8 9 8 8
tesest$123 9 6 8 8 9 9 9
$Pppppp234 8 6 7 8 9 8 9
Hhhhh@123h 8 5 8 9 8 9 8
Whyu@me789 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
how@Cap456 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
Average 9.3 5.9 7.9 9.4 9.5 9.4 9.5
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Table-A I-6 Experimental results of the the HTC Desire HD at session 3
HTC Desire HD session 3
Passwords
CIBC
Bank
BMO
Bank
Natioanl
Bank
RBC
Bank
Scotia
Bank
TD
canada
Bank
PayPal
Alq012$suv 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
zSd@347ege 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
123Pa$sword 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
Ghau789@fb 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
het239$quI 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
123@Myname 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
Canda$987p 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
loL$123lol 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
Home@123jk 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
Capme@123k 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
Test$890me 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
suv345@Qsd 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
where789@d 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
my478@Test 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
Ets@123cap 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
Mount@345s 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
234$testMe 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
wHen@u234s 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
some$123He 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
How$ukn235 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
Pets$567we 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
Tttt@789un 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
Gggggg@234 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
Mmmmmm@111 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
Jjjjjj$999 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
tesest$123 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
$Pppppp234 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
Hhhhh@123h 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
Whyu@me789 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
how@Cap456 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
Average 10 6 8 10 10 10 10
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